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The Ins and Outs of IATA: Improving the
Role of the United States in the
Regulation of International Air Fares
It is a settled principle of international law that the sovereignty of a
state extends throughout the airspace directly above its territory.' In
the exercise of this sovereignty one of the conditions commonly im-
posed upon the operating rights of foreign aircraft is that for commer-
cial flights, these aircraft must charge fares acceptable to the host coun-
1. B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 3 (1962); M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & I. VLAsic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 254 (1963). See generally W. WAu-
NER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS AFFECTED BY STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Brussels
1970).
The principle of state sovereignty over the airspace above national territories was ex-
tensively debated prior to World War One. At this time the French were the principal
advocates of "freedom of the air," with Great Britain the leading spokesman for air sov-
ereignty. Even at this early stage of aeronautical development, proponents of "freedont
of the air" bore the burden of persuasion in the debate. Implicit in efforts to achieve i-
ternational agreement on freedom of the air was the notion that there was some sort of
existing sovereign authority over national airspace which, until relinquished, would
allow a state to exclude foreign aircraft from its airspace. Thus an International Cot-
ference on Air Navigation was convened at Paris in 1910 in the hope that it would lead
to a convention giving air transport the international rights of access then desired by the
French. After the Paris Conference foundered on the sovereignty issue, European states,
including France, began explicitly to assert sovereignty over national airspace. Se' L.
ToMBs, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT 4-6 (1936); C. CnIRISTOL,
TRANSIT BY AIR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-74 (1944). Following the First World War, the
countries of continental Europe wanted no part of "freedom of the air." Tile British
reversed their earlier position but now found no support for proposals to limit air sov-
ereignty. The Paris Peace Conference ultimately gave rise to the first multilateral procla.
mation of the principle of air sovereignty, the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, [1922] G.B.T.S. No. 2, 11 L.N.T.S. 173. See 0. LIssITZYN, INTrtt.
NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY 366 (1942).
Although the United States was a signatory, the United States did not ratify the Paris
Convention. The first official assertion of the United States' sovereignty over its airspace
came in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, § 6(a), ch. 344, § 6(a), 44 Stat. 572 (repealed 1958).
The first multilateral affirmation of the principle of air sovereignty which the United
States did ratify was the Pan American Conventon for Commercial Air Navigation, Feb.
20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1901 (1933), T.S. No. 840. The latest multilateral convention ratified by
the United States which is declarative of air sovereignty is the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1591. The Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 ff. (1970) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 85-726,
72 Stat. 731), re-enacted the Air Commerce Act's declaration of air sovereignty as §
1108(a), 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970).
The settled international law of national sovereignty over airspace should not be con.
fused with the much less certain rights of a state regarding the outer space above Its
territory. See generally J. COOPER, ExPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW (I. Vlasic ed. 1968):
M. McDOUGAL, ET AL., supra. For the difficulties in distinguishing between airspace atld
outer space, see M. McDOUGAL, Er AL., id., at 33-35, 244.
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try. Disputes as to the proper fares to be charged for such flights have
been resolved through an international legal process, under which the
great majority of the world's scheduled international air carriers de-
termine their own rates. These airlines negotiate tariff agreements
which fix the price of air travel on most internaional routes. The
central institution of this system is the International Air Transport
Association (IATA).2
In recent months, the instability of IATA tariff agreements and the
inability of IATA to arrive expeditiously at new tariff agreements
have led to speculation that IATA may be on the verge of internal
collapse. 3 Heartened by such a prospect are the consumer advocates who
have long attacked IATA as a cartel dedicated to the preservation of
artificially high fares at the expense of the travelling public.4 Yet both
the prophets and the proponents of IATA's demise have failed to con-
sider adequately whether all forms of regulation of air faires can be
avoided, and if not, what sort of alternative regulatory apparatus would
be more desirable than IATA.
This Note accepts the present international legal process for regulat-
2. In 1970 IATA airlines carried 89.2 per cent of total world scheduled traffic, fler,
87.1 per cent of the world's scheduled passenger-kilometers and 93.2 per cent of world
scheduled freight ton-kilometers. As of Nov. 18, 1971, there were ninety active member
airlines of IATA and sixteen associate member airlines. 39 LATA BuLL. 60, 128.29 (1971).
3. For reports of IATA's problems in the summer and fall of 1971. see N.Y. Times.
June 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1; id., June 4, 1971, at 70, col. 7; id., June 5, 1971, at 57, col. 3;
Wall St. J., June 9, 1971, at 23, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 1, col. 6; id., June
12, 1971, at 1, col. 4; id., June 15, 1971, at 85, col. 1; Avall St. J., June 15, 1971, at 14, col.
4; id., June 16, 1971, at 34, col. 1; id., June 17, 1971, at 6, col. 2; id., June 18, 1971, at 7.
col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1971, at 78, col. 6; id., June 20, 1971, § .1, at 3, col. 1; Wall
St. J., June 22, 1971, at 5, col. 2; id., June 23, 1971, at 38, col. I; id., June 24, 1971, at 6.
col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 24, 1971, at 79, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 25, 1971. at 10, col. 1,
and at 18, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1971, § 5, at 26, col. 1; Wall St. J., June 28, 1971,
at 6, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1971, at 82, col. 1; id., July 1, 1971, at 84, col. 4; id.,
July 3, 1971, at 50, col. 1; id., July 4, 1971, § 4, at 19, col. 6; id., July 11, 1971, § 10, at
35, col. 1; id., July 18, 1971, § 10, at 31, col. 1; id., Aug. 1, 1971, § 1, at 51, col. 1; id.,
Aug. 5, 1971, at 66, col. 1; id., Aug. 7, 1971, at 48, col. 5; id., Aug. 8, 1971, § 10, at 4, col.
6; id., Aug. 12, 1971, at 66, col. 5; id., Aug. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 1; id., Aug. 14, 1971, at 50,
col. 6; id., Aug. 15, 1971, § 4, at 5, col. 1; id., Sept. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 2; id., Sept. 22,
1971, at 14, col. 1; id., Sept. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7; Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1971, at 4, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1971, at 78, col. 4; id., Oct. 17, 1971, § 10, at 27, col. 1; id., Nov. 20,
1971, at 62, col. 4; Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1971, at 9, col. 3.
Summaries of the 1971 IATA crisis may be found in Hoffman, The Great Air Fare War
and What It Means to You, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1971, § 10, at 1, col. 1, and in S. REP. No.
92-593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-16 (1972), reprinted in 118 Co.N. Rc. S2460.61 (daily ed.
Feb. 24, 1972).
4. The attack began with the dissent to the Civil Aeronautics Board's decision to ap-
prove American air carriers' participation in IATA. LATA Traffic Conference Resolution,
6 C.A.B. 639, 646 (1946) (Member Lee, dissenting). See note 68 infra. The Aviation Con-
sumer Action Project, affiliated with Ralph Nader, recently filed a suit seeking to over-
turn this original acceptance of IATA by the CAB. Civil Action No. 2188-71 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 1, 1971). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1971, at 41, col. 1.
The "cartel" label as applied to IATA was discussed at length in Hearings on Monopoly
Problems in Regulated Industries before the Antitrust Subcoinin. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt. 1, at 1048-54 (1957). Cf. note 119 infra.
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ing air fares as a relatively successful means of resolving disputes among
sovereign states in an orderly, non-coercive manner. By affording an in-
formal forum for the settlement of conflicts over economic practices in
an industry of vital importance to most states, IATA provides a mech-
anism for the compromise of national interests without the appearance
of compromising national integrity. While the existing system operates
in some respects disadvantageously to the United States, significant im-
provements can be made within the IATA context. Ameliorative meas-
ures affecting the American role within IATA would avoid the risks
inherent in unilateral efforts to "deregulate" international air trans-
port: interruptions of air service, politicization of the regulatory proc-
ess through the assumption of the price-fixing function by governments
as an officially diplomatic task, and consequent burdens on trade and
communications.
To be sure, IATA agreements serve to insulate IATA members from
price competition and many forms of service competition. But this
insulation from competition is not in itself at odds with American
public policy, for domestic American airlines are similarly protected.
The protection of domestic carriers has been linked, however, with pro-
tection of the public interest by a responsible governmental agency.
Through the comprehensive powers vested in the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), commercial aviation within the United States has been
subjected to strict economic regulation.5 Congress has not chosen, how-
ever, to exercise its right under international law to give the CAB
similarly comprehensive powers to protect and promote the public
interest by setting fares in international commercial aviation. Further-
more, of all major aeronautical states which participate in IATA's rate.
making process, only the United States delegates the role of spokes-
man for the public interest to privately owned airlines.0
American participation in IATA has thus lacked the imprimatur
of governmental authority necessary for the American public interest
in economical air fares to be given fair consideration. Growing con-
sciousness of American impotence in the international fare-setting
5. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed 1958), created the
Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA). The CAA became the CAB pursuant to Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. IV, 54 Stat. 1234, transmitted to Congress on April 11, 1940, by President
Roosevelt under the authority of the Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561. No
change in the CAA/CAB's powers of economic regulation was involved. Reorganization
Plan No. IV, § 7(b), 54 Stat. 1235. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 If.(1970), re-enacted the economic regulatory provisions of the 1938 Act "virtually without
substantive change," in the words of a CAB staff attorney. Lindsey, The Legislative De-
velopment of Civil Aviation 1938-1958, 28 J. AIR L. & Com. 18, 33 (1962).
6. See note 111 infra.
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process has prompted Congress to pass the 1972 amendmentT to the
Federal Aviation Act," enabling the CAB to disapprove fares of inter-
national airlines. While this remedial legislation should enhance
American influence within IATA, it is disturbing that Congress dis-
carded a preferable alternative-empowering the CAB itself to pre-
scribe international air fares.9
This Note will examine the legislation which was before the Con-
gress and analyze the role the CAB can and should play in establish-
ing international air fares. After placing IATA in its historical con-
text, the politics of IATA will be explicated and it will be shown that
the United States has been placed at a disadvantage in IATA nego-
tiations because of deficiencies in the powers of the CAB. Following a
discussion of the need for continued regulation of international air
fares, Congress' choice between alternative means of enhancing Ameri-
can influence within the regulatory process will be criticized and the
optimal role of the CAB delineated.
I. Evolution of an International Legal Process for the Regulation of
Air Fares
A. Origins in Europe and the United States
The International Air Transport Association is a reincarnation of
the International Air Traffic Association, which was formed in 1919
and terminated by the Second World War.10 An institution such as the
old IATA was essential to the development of scheduled air service
in Europe. The small size of the European states meant that any flight
of sufficient length to provide significant economies of time over
surface transportation was almost certain to cross national boundaries.
As a consequence, no European country could develop its civil avia-
tion industry primarily within a domestic market.11 Commercial avia-
tion was to be almost synonymous with international aviation. More-
7. Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-259, 86 Stat. 95. 1972 US. CODE Co.c. & AD.
NEWs 806; see pp. 1135-36, 1146.49 infra.
8. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 ff. (1970).
9. S.2423, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 4, 1971), referred to as the CAB draft of S.2423,
or "paragraph (e) powers." See p. 1146 ff. infra.
10. S. COHEN, IATA: THE Frsr THREE DECADES 14, 78 (1949).
11. This was the single most important difference between Europe and the United
States in their respective development of airlines. The continental span of the United
States could encompass an efficient air transport system within a single sovereign jurisdic-
tion. Cf. notes 20-22 infra. Compare H. SssrH. AIRWAYS (1942). with R. HiGiLomA. RIuTAIN'S
IMPERIAL AIR Rou-rEs 1918 To 1939 (1960) and S. 1IHEAicRovr, TIlE EcoNoMics or Euno-
PEAN Am TRANsPoRT (1956).
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over, the trans-national nature of the European air commerce market
meant that no one state had plenary jurisdiction to regulate the eco-
nomics of air transport. Yet the struggle to recover from the destruction
and dislocation of resources caused by World War I bred sharp eco-
nomic rivalries among the European governments. 12 This friction in-
hibited recognition of a common interest in commercial aviation and
prevented cooperative, inter-governmental regulation of European
air transport. The carriers themselves thus assumed responsibility for
the concerted action necessary to promote commercial aviation through
the establishment of uniform conditions of carriage and the ration-
alization of routes and schedules.
Although unable to affirm a common interest in the development
of commercial aviation, European governments were quick to employ
civil air transport to advance their individual national interests. Within
a few years of the Armistice of 1918, extensive government ownership
and subsidization of the major national airlines had become the norm
in Europe. The colonial empires of the victoriou Grand Alliance
powers had emerged from the First World War intact. Aviation prom-
ised to provide speedy communication between the imperialist countries
and their colonies. As a means of gaining and maintaining influence,
the civil air power of any one country threatened the imperial security
of the others; hence, the European governments viewed commercial
aviation more as an instrument of state than a profit-making business,
and plowed immense amounts of capital into its development. 13 Direct
subsidies to the national carriers flying intra-European routes became
routine.14 By the mid-twenties, the imperial routes began to inch
across the map, first over the Mediterranean, then on to Asia and
Africa.' 5
For those without empires, there was South America. Private Ger-
man capital began setting up airlines within South America as early as
1920. Within six years, the German government had assumed control
of most of these lines, and Germany pushed forward vigorously to
12. See generally R. SONTAG, EUROPEAN DIPLOMxATIC HISTORY 1871-1932, at 305-22 (1933):
E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939, at 54-60 (1964 ed.).
13. 0. LISSiTZYN, supra note 1, at 137-99.
14. See, e.g., R. HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 39-75; L. ToNIBS, supra note 1, at 31-33.
Once subsidization became the norm, it also became a necessity for survival. No unsub.
sidized carrier could weather the predatory tactics of the subsidized lines. See R. HItIIAM,
supra, at 44-45. For a table listing the amounts of subsidy paid to civil aviation by
principal aeronautical countries during the years 1933-1936 see Appendix I1, MIalTis11
AIR MINISTRY, 1936 REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF CIVIL AVIATION 136-42 (1937).
15. R. DAVIES, A HISTORY OF THE VORLD'S AIRLINES 170-86 (1964); R. HI0IAAM, supra
note 11 passim; J. STROUD, ANNALS OF BRITISH AND COMMONWEALTH AIR TRANSPORT 23-175
(1962).
1106
Vol. 81: 1102, 1972
The Ins and Outs of IATA
establish a network of German-financed airlines serving the intra-
continental South American air transportation market.',
Pan American was the only American international airline of the
inter-war period,17 and its development paralleled the European model
in many respects. The company was first formed in 1927, as an Ameri-
can rival to the German aviation interests in South America, which
seemed to threaten the Canal Zone.'8 Pan Am's subsequent Clipper
service across the Pacific received strong support from the Navy.'0
Most important of all, PAA received a subsidy from the government
which not only went uninterrupted by the scandal which terminated
domestic airline subsidies in 1934,20 but was also far in excess of that
received by any domestic American air carrier.2
16. V. BuRIwE, THE STRUGGLE FOR AIRWAYS IN L/TIN AMIERIcA 11-13, 38-46 (1943).
17. Pan American actually consisted, for tax purposes. of three separate operating
corporations controlled by a single holding company. All of these operations, plus Pan
American-Grace Airways (of which Pan Am and the Grace Steamship Company each
owned one halt) are referred to in this Note as "Pan American." "Pan Am." or *'AA.
For Pan Am's corporate structure during this period, see G. CooD.MAx, GovfjIL',%r POL-
IcY TOWARD COMMERCIAL AVIATION 81 (1944).
18. H. SMITH, AIRWAYS ABROAD 10-14 (1950); M. JOSEPHSON. E'm-MPRE OF THlE AIR 43, 51
(1944).
19. H. S.irrH, supra note 18, at 34.
20. The Army carried all domestic air mail in the United States until 1926. The
Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805, allowed private airlines to bid for air mail
contracts for the first time. Five years of confusion followed as various schemes for com-
pensating air mail carriers were tried out, at a time when air mail ias the only signifi-
cant source of revenue for the domestic airlines. Finally, President Hoover's Postmaster
General Walter F. Brown acquired in the Watres Act of 1930 near dictatorial powers
to control air mail contracts. Act of April 29, 1930, ch. 223. 46 Stat. 259. Brown quickly
set about hammering out an efficient route system. Through forced mergers and the
manipulation of contract requirements so as to exclude bids by sinall operators, the "Big
Four" trunk carriers extant today, United, Eastern, TWA, and American, eliferged with
most of the air mail contracts.
When an investigation chaired by Senator (later Justice) Hugo Black uncovered the
full extent to which Postmaster General Brown had pushed his discretion. see Hearings
before a Special Comm. on Investigation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, US. Sen..
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), New Dealers were quick to attack Brown's actions as typical
of the high-handedness with which the Republicans had sold the little manl down the
economic river to Depression. Amid charges of collusion and a "spoils conference," all
domestic air mail contracts were cancelled by Roosevelt's Postmaster General. James A.
Farley. By executive order later backed up by statute, the Army reassumed its earlier
responsibility for the carriage of air mail. Exec. Order No. 6391, Feb. 9, 193-1; Act of
March 27, 1934, ch. 100, 48 Stat. 408. See generally H. S.tm, supra note 11 passim; S.
RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMIETriTON IN AIR TRANSPIORTATION 4-6 (1961); C. RitYE,
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AcT ANNOTATED 20-23 (1939).
21. Until passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act, there was no explicit segregation of
federal subsidy payments from federal air mail payments generally. The extent to which
federal mail contracts were implicitly subsidizing the airlines was usually calculated on
the basis of the difference between government receipts and government expenditures
on air mail. See J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSI'ORTATION 240 (1912). On this basis,
Pan American and its jointly-held subsidiary, Pan American-Grace, see note 17 supra,
received $47,202,000 in subsidy for the eleven fiscal years July 1. 1929-June 30, 1910. The
total subsidy received by all American domestic airlines for the same period was
S59,852,000. During this time, the domestic airlines flew some eight times the passenger-
miles that Pan Am did. Although the average mail payment per mile flown by Pan Am
decreased forty-three per cent between 1930 and 1940, it was still in 1940 three times the
amount paid per mile to domestic carriers. AV. BURDEN. supra note 16, at 116-17.
1107
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 81: 1102, 1972
The disruptions of domestic aviation in 1934 touched off four years
of congressional debate over the proper role of the government in the
regulation of civil aviation. -2 The culmination of this debate was the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,23 which subjected the domestic air
transport industry to a comprehensive program of economic regulation.
The cornerstone of this regulation was plenary governmental control
over rates charged for air transportation.
In 1938, the limited range of commercial aircraft made long-distance
international service dependent on a network of refuelling stations.
Transatlantic service had not yet been inaugurated. No foreign airline
provided regular service to the United States.24 The severe competition
of foreign airlines which Pan American encountered in South America
was confined within that intra-continental market, beyond the juris-
diction of the United States government. 25
For these reasons, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 focussed almost
exclusively on the manifold problems of the domestic air carriers.
Provision was made for licensing Pan American, and for controlling
entry into the market (and American airspace) of those international
air carriers, both foreign and American, which might seek operating
22. The Army's resumption of responsibility for the air mail proved disastrous, and
was abandoned two months later after the deaths of twelve pilots and a fourfold
increase in the cost per mile to the government for the movement of mall. H. SMsrml,
supra note 11, at 251, 255-57.
This fiasco allowed Roosevelt's opponents to regain the political initiative. Brown's
policies had obviously produced a measure of national benefit as well as private profits.
Both sides were mollified by the Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933, wich re.
pealed existing legislation and awarded regulatory powers over air mail carriers to three
agencies. The Post Office was to award contracts and determine routes and schedules,
the Interstate Commerce Commission was to adjust the contracted rates of compensation
when necessary; and the Department of Commerce was to provide technical regulation.
It soon became apparent that air mail was no longer an effective means for controlling
the development of commercial aviation. Passenger and freight revenue provided in 1938
nearly twice as much income for domestic air mail carriers as did mail payments them.
selves. C. RHYNE, supra note 20, at 2. The route system created by Postmaster General
Brown was endangered by competitors which siphoned off passenger revenue from mall
carriers, contrary to the favored policy of "internal" subsidization whereby the passenger
revenue on heavily-travelled routes was expected to reduce the cost of mail service on
lightly-travelled routes. See, e.g., S. RIclMOND, supra note 20, at 73-74, 154-58. An amend.
ment to the Air Mail Act, Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 530, 49 Stat. 614, sought to limit
competition for passenger revenue among mail carriers, but failed to reach airlines
without mail contracts. The severity of the competition led the major airlines themselves
to be active lobbyists for the comprehensive regulation of domestic air transportation
established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. See generally C. Rtv NE, supra note 20,
at 6-7, 41-65, 189-220; F. THAYER, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SEcUrvr" 16-18
(1965). See also Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 309 (1967).
23. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed 1958).
24. See Hearings on H.R. 9738 (To Create a Civil Aeronautics Authority) before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 40.41, 376 (1938).
25. W. BURDEN, supra note 16, at 16-17, 60-61. Hearings on S. 3659 (Civil Aviation and
Air Transport) before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1938).
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rights in the future.20 On the crucial question of government control
over the rates of international carriers, however, action was deferred
pending further study.2 7 For the moment, international airlines were
left to their own economic devices.2 8
26. Entry into the market was controlled through §§ 401 and 402, 52 Stat. 987-92(superseded by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371 and 1372 (1970)), sec p. 1134 inlra. Pan American's
continued operating rights were assured by a "grandfather clause," § 401(e), 52 Stat. 988.
27. § 404(c), 52 Stat. 993. See Hearings on S. 3760 (Civil Aeronautics Authority) before
a Subcommn. of the Senate Comm. onl Comm ,erce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3 (1938).
28. One commentator has persuasively argued that the uneasy symbiosis of the Thirties
between Pan American and the United States governmnent provided the pattern for
American policy on international aviation after the Second World War. According to
F. THAYER, supra note 22, at 33-37, the scenario was as follows:
In the mid-1920's, American military officials becane alarned at the mounting German
influence in South America, and in particular at the operations of the German.controlled
Colombian airline, SCADTA, which operated in proximity to the Panama Canal. Con-
sultations with the Post Office revealed that in lieu of any American bids, a contract for
Latin American mail might go to SCADTA. The officers managed to interest some en-
trepreneurs in forming an airline for Latin American operations, and the Post Office
obligingly denied the Colombian airline's request for a contract. Pan American was the
first of several airlines to be organized for the exploitation of the South American market.
By obtaining exclusive landing rights from Cuba, Pan Am obtained a pre.eminent poi.
tion, and when the Air Mail Act was amended in 1930 to give the Postmaster General
near-plenary power over air mail routes, see note 20 supra, PAA was established as the
only American overseas carrier. With occasional aid from the State Department, Pan Am
built up an extensive system of traffic rights throughout Latin America. This reinforced
its monopoly position as the only American international airline, so that it could submit
bids for air-mail contracts at the highest legal rate and fear no competition. PAA's exclu-
sive rights in Latin America and the Roosevelt Administration's concern for its Good
Neighbor Policy insulated Pan Am from the repercussions of the air mail scandal of
1934, when all domestic airline contracts were cancelled as collusive. Its position secure
in South America, Pan Am turned to the Pacific region for the next extension of its
route network, this time receiving substantial support from the Navy.
Under the "grandfather clause" of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Pan Am as an existing
air carrier was granted the right to a certificate of public convenience and necessity
upon a pro forma showing of its prior operations. The Roosevelt Administration did
not like Pan Am's monopoly status in American overseas aviation, but the grand-
father clause and Pan Am's stranglehold on foreign landing rights shielded the airline
from any immediate steps to introduce competition into the international air transport
field. While Administration spokesmen were attacking Pan An publicly, tie ad euJt of
the Second World War in Europe forced secret government funding of Pan Am's Latin
American operations, through which some fifty airports were built or improved, for later
use as the principal network for channeling aircraft and supplies to Great Britain %ia
Africa and Portugal. The Government also financed Pan Am's acquisition of German
interests in various South American airlines.
In the midst of this covert support of PAA. an American shipping company organized a
competing transatlantic carrier, American Export Airlines (AMEX). Pan Am had ob-
tained a certificate for Atlantic service to England in 1938, along both a northerly
Canadian route and a southern route via Lisbon. Soon after service was inaugurated in
1939, the war sealed off Britain, but the Lisbon route continued to offer access to Con-
tinental Europe. Portugal was ready to grant traffic rights to a second airline, and
AMEX's application for a certificate was seized upon by the CAB and the Administration
as an initial step in breaking the Pan American monopoly.
Given the existing traffic to Europe, however, a second airline was not commercially
justified. Increased air-mail payments would therefore be essential to support both Pan
Am and a competitor on the transatlantic route. Pan Am succeeded in marshalling its
congressional allies and defeating the requisite appropriations, halting AMEX's planned
operations and handing Roosevelt a bitter political defeat. As a result, the Administration
was to keep one eye open throughout the war for the opportunity to end Pan American's
monopoly when peace returned.
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B. The Chicago Conference
The Second World War brought to sudden maturity the long-haul,
land-based transport aircraft. The flying boats of prewar international
aviation were relegated to patrol duty, and were replaced as transports
by four-engined airplanes designed for the long distance flights neces-
sary to supply Allied forces and bomb Axis countries.20 With its newly
developed range and power, aviation was clearly destined to be a major
force in the postwar world, from a commercial as well as a military
perspective.30 To establish the legal underpinnings for a global air
transport system, the United States convened an International Civil
Aviation Conference in Chicago on November 1, 1944.31
The United States advanced a convention creating virtually total
"freedom of the air" through a multilateral exchange of the so-called
"Five Freedoms. ' 32 The scheduled carriers of parties to the treaty
would have nearly unrestricted rights of commercial operation to and
through all other parties. Economic decisions as to fares, frequencies,
and routes would be left to the discretion of airline managements, sub-
29. F. THAYER, supra note 22, at 49-50; John A. Miller, Air Diplomacy: The Chi-
cago Civil Aviation Conference of 1944 in Anglo.American Wartime Relations and Post.
war Planning, at 51, 59-62, March, 1971 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Yale University
Library).
30. Id. at 78.
31. Id. at 177. Fifty-two countries sent voting delegates to the Conference. In addition,
two nations were represented by non-voting observers. 1 U.S. DEPT OF STArE, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE 13, 119 (1948) (hereinafter cited a
Chicago Proceedings]. The Soviet Union was invited, but recalled its delegation as It
was en route to Chicago, allegedly because of the participation of three neutral countries,
Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland, whom the Soviets accused of having had Axis syntpa.
thies. R. THORNTON, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND POLITICs 22 (1970); W. O'CONNOut, ECO-
NOMIC REGULATION OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES 29 (1971).
32. The International Air Transport Agreement setting forth the Five Freedoms ap-
pears in Chicago Proceedings, supra note 31, at 179. The considerations leading to the
American position are explored in Miller, supra note 29, at 86-114. For a look at some
of the ambiguities of the International Air Transport Agreement see W. O'CONNOR, supra
note 31, at 42-45. The International Air Transport Agreement, which was in effect briefly
between the United States and a few other states, cf. note 42, infra, defined as follows the
"Five Freedoms," which have since become a basic part of air transport jargon:
Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms
of the air in respect of scheduled international air services:
(1) [Transit] The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;
(2) [Technical stop] The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;
(3) [Out-bound traffic stop] The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo
taken on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft pos'esses:
(4) [In-bound traffic stop] The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
(5) [External traffic stop] The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo
destined for the territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to put
down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory.
With respect to the privileges specified under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) of this
section, the undertaking of each contracting State relates only to through services oil
a route constituting a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland of
the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses.
International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. I. § 1, 59 Stat. 170 (1945), E.A.S.
No. 448.
1110
The Ins and Outs of IATA
ject to whatever conditions were placed upon their operating rights
by their own governments. Since the GAB had no power to control
international fares, American international airlines would thus be
subject to no economic regulation whatsoever.33
The United States saw this delegation of economic decisions to the
airlines as the international embodiment of the American free enter-
prise system. Ease of entry and competitive pricing would allow the
market efficiently to match supply and demand. Other nations were
not blind to the fact that this competitive model reflected more the
myth than the reality of the American air transport industry. True,
the tremendous growth of American domestic aviation during the
thirties had been financed by private capital, but air mail contracts
had provided concealed operating subsidies. 34 The comprehensive
regulatory scheme of 1938 had not only controlled entry into the do-
mestic airline business but had provided rate regulation as well, to the
great relief of existing airlines, which had become locked into so-
called "uneconomic" rate wars.35
More than this gulf between the theory and practice of American
"free enterprise" aviation policy served to make the lofty internation-
alism of the United States' call for "freedom of the air" ring hollow.
The United States possessed in 1944 a competitive advantage in com-
mercial aviation of overwhelming magnitude. The United States had
not only a huge surplus of transport equipment poised to enter the
international air transport market, 30 but also thousands of experienced
pilots already familiar with the routes to be flown.37 For the Euro-
peans, with devastated economies and obsolete equipment, a com-
33. Aside from CAB certification to fly a particular route, see note 26 supra.
34. Cf. note 21 supra. The federal government also expended throu.h 1940 some
$126,468,000 on the maintenance and construction of domestic airway facilities. W. Burr-
DEN, supra note 16, at 116.
35. Cf. note 22 supra.
36. The aircraft and airline industries of most of Continental Europe had. of course,
fallen into Nazi hands. Britain, by agreement with the United States, had concentrated
on fighter production. The United States had in turn channelled its aircraft industry
primarily into the production of bombers and transports. Miller, supra note 29, at 64, 76;
THoRNToN, supra note 31, at 23. DAVIES, supra note 15, at 239, admits the disparate
emphases of A'merican and British wartime aircraft production, but denies the existence
of any agreement to that effect. But cf. A. JAcKsON, I Bhrrisit CIVIL AIRcAFr 1919-1959,
at 121 (1959); H. S.irr, supra note 18, at 70.
37. Through a complex military-civilian airlift system (motivated in part by the
Roosevelt Administration's continuing desire to open the international market to Ameri-
can competitors of Pan Am (cf. note 28, supra)). American domestic airlines had joined
Pan American in setting up and flying global routes under military contracts to supply
Allied forces. F. TnAYER, supra note 22, at 49-55; H. Serm, supra note 18, at 63.91;
L. ZACHAOFF, THE WORLD'S WINGS 7-8 (1946). Pan American saw the threat to its
position, and bitterly opposed Roosevelt's "Freedom of the Air' policy at Chicago. See
Cone, International Air Transportation, in VITAL PROBLE.MS OF Am Com muaci 17 (L.
Zacharoff ed. 1946).
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petitive market would have meant extinction of their aviation capa-
bilities.
As the prewar subsidy battles of the imperial airlines had shown,
anti-competitive devices were to the Europeans an accepted method
for protecting national interests. The European position, as articulated
by the British, was accordingly to demand an international regulatory
authority with powers to control rates, routes, and schedules as a pre-
requisite to the surrender of sovereign control over national airspace.38
Such an international agency would uphold the economic and security
interests of each nation by apportioning the available traffic among
national carriers so as to ensure the coordinated development of each
state's aviation capability.30
There was nearly unanimous accord at Chicago on the propriety
of a reciprocal grant of the rights (1) to fly over a country without
stopping and (2) to stop for fuel or servicing without picking up or
discharging passengers and freight. These so-called First and Second
Freedom rights40 were exchanged through signature of the Inter-
national Air Services Transit Agreement.41 Due to the regulatory de-
mands of the Europeans, the Conference was unable to reach general
agreement on the exchange of so-called Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Freedom rights. 42 These traffic rights permit a given country to pro-
vide air service from that country to a second country and from the
second country back to the first country (Third and Fourth Free-
doms), and for the first country's airline to provide air service from
38. Speech of Lord Swinton, chairman of the United Kingdom delegation, Chicago
Proceedings, supra note 31, at 63-67. The Canadians drew an explicit parallel to the
CAB's domestic jurisdiction. Speech of C.D. Howe, head of the Canadian delegation, id.
at 67-74. See generally W. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 20-29; Miller, supra note 29, at
115-45.
39. The British and their allies at Chicago were not without bargaining power. Tie
United States' technological advantages were offset by British and European geo-polltlcal
advantages. By a concerted denial of landing rights to American airlines, the Europeans
could lock the United States out of the transatlantic air transport market-tie United
States would have no "Third and Fourth Freedom" traffic to Europe. The Europeans
could meanwhile serve the transatlantic market through Canada. Moreover, the British
together with the Commonwealth countries could provide round-the-world service on an
"All-Red" route, red being the color traditionally used in atlases to designate territory
under British dominion. Should the Commonwealth countries join Britain and Europe
in an American boycott, no rival American global air service would be possible because
the need for fuel as well as "Fifth Freedom" traffic made long-haul air routes dependent
on a good number of intermediate landing spots. See R. ThiORNTON, supra note 31, at
28-29.
40. Cf. note 32 supra.
41. Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693 (1945), E.A.S. No. 487.
42. Cf. note 32 supra. The International Air Transport Agreement was signed by only
a few minor countries besides the United States. Following the Bermuda Conference, see
pp. 1114-17 infra, and the Senate's ratification of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, see note 43 infra, the United States denounced the International Air Transport
Agreement on July 25, 1946, effective July 26, 1947. Department of State Press Release
No. 510 (July 25, 1946), 3 Av. L. REP. 26,300, at 22,728 (June 9, 1958).
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the second country to third countries (Fifth Freedom). Recognizing
"that it is desirable to promote early development in this field [of in-
ternational aviation] during a transitional period, in order to obtain
practical experience for giving effect to more permanent arrangements
at a later date," the Final Act of the Chicago Conference sought to
outflank the impasse over economic regulation by providing a stand-
ard form for "provisional" agreements exchanging Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Freedom rights on a bilateral basis.43
C. The Resurrection of IA TA
The final meeting of the prewar IATA had, in 1938, elected Pan
American Airways as its first North American member, and in recog-
nition of the coming era of transatlantic air service had scheduled its
next meeting for New York in September, 1939.44 The outbreak of war
ended IATA operations, but many of the officials of its Continental
members congregated in London and attached themselves to the vari-
ous governments in exile established there.4 5 Many of these business-
men-cum-bureaucrats attended the Chicago Conference as delegates
and advisors, and when the economic stalemate among governments
became apparent, they arranged a meeting of airline operators in
Chicago immediately after the formal Conference adjourned.40 Sev-
eral of the American domestic airlines, having expanded into the
international field through their wartime airlift operations, were
among the thirty-four airlines represented at this convocation.
A conference in Havana in April, 1945, approved Articles of Asso-
ciation which extended membership in the reconstituted International
Air Transport Association to any scheduled international carrier flying
the flag of a member state of the newly formed International Civil
43. Chicago Proceedings, supra note 31, at 127-29. Except on the issue of economic con-
trols, the Chicago Conference was a splendid success. A Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (effective April 4, 1947 , set
up technical standards for aerial navigation, and created the International Civil Aiation
Organization (ICAO), a multi-level body for the promotion of international aviation. A
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) was established by execu-
tive agreement to perform the duties of the ICAO until such time as the Convention on
International Civil Aviation was ratified as a treaty. Interim Agreement on International
Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1516 (1945), E.AS. No. 487.
The ICAO is empowered to "study any matters affecting the organization and operation
of international air transport, including the international ownership and operation of
international air services on truck routes .... " Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion, art. 55 (d), 61 Stat. 1197 (1947), T.IA.S. No. 1591, at 22. The ICAO has nevertheless
eschewed participation in the international legal process for regulating air fares. See
K. PXLLA, THE AIR NEr 122-36 (1969). See generally T. BuERGENTILr L, LAxW-MAKING IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvIATION ORGANIZATION (1969).
44. S. ConHN, supra note 10, at 77.
45. Id. at 79-80.
46. Id. at 80.
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Aviation Organization (ICAO).47 These Articles established as the aim
of IATA the development of international commercial aviation in
cooperation with the ICAO. The unwritten assumption of the carriers
involved was that IATA would resume its prewar function of provid-
ing a forum for "informal" price-fixing and divisions of the market.4,
This intention was made explicit when IATA voted unanimously in
October 1945 to set up regional "Traffic Conferences. ' 40 These con-
ferences consider and act upon "all international air traffic matters
... particularly the following:-... fares, rates and charges for passen-
gers and cargo; [and] schedules .... ."0 Actions are dependent upon
the unanimous agreement of all carriers operating in a given region.61
It was not immediately apparent whether such unanimity would
be forthcoming from the airlines any more than from the governments
themselves. In October, 1945, Pan American announced plans to drop
its North Atlantic fares by nearly thirty per cent.0 2 The ensuing up-
roar in Great Britain and France made it clear that these governments
would insist on some form of rate control in international aviation. 3
In December, 1945, when IATA was incorporated in Montreal-the
site of ICAO-it was still unclear what role IATA would play in pro-
viding this control.54
D. The Bermuda Bilateral
The United States and Great Britain met in Bermuda in January
1946 to work out a bilateral air services agreement."0 This was to be
the first significant "provisional"50 agreement pending multilateral
47. Id. at 102; cf. note 43 supra.
48. S. COHEN, supra note 10, at 64.
49. Id. at 82; IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 CAB 639, 640 (1916), The Con.
ferences were originally nine in number, but were reduced to the present number of three
within two years. S. COHEN, supra note 10, at 87; IATA Traffic Conference Resolution,
9 CAB 221 n.4 (1948).
50. Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the IATA Traffic Conferences, art.
IV, § l(ii), (iii) INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AssocIATIoN, RULES & REGULATIONS 55 (8th
pub. 1966), reprinted in A. CHAYES. T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 274-77 (1968).
51. Id. at art. VII, § 1. For descriptions of the mechanics of IATA tariff negotiations
see Gazdik, Rate-Making and the IATA Traffic Conferences, 16 J. AIR L. & C. 298 (19419)
Koffler, IATA: Its Legal Structure-a Critical Review, 32 J. Am L. 9: C. 222, 224.27, 230-32
(1966). See also the book and articles by S. Ralph Cohen, former Public Relations Officer
of IATA, cited in note 117 infra.
52. The proposed reduction was from $375 (one way) to $275. H. SMITH, supra note 18,
at 251-52.
53. Id.
54. S. COHEN, supra note 10, at 82.
55. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda
bilateral].
56. Cf. p. 1113 supra.
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accord on the exchange of traffic rights,57 and was destined to serve
as a model for most subsequent bilateral agreements to which the
United States has been a party.58 In return for Britain's retraction of its
demand at Chicago for controls on the number of flights each party
could offer over a particular route, the United States agreed to eco-
nomic regulation under the auspices of IATA.r9
Under the Bermuda bilateral, the IATA "rate conference ma-
chinery," consisting of negotiation among the carriers, was given pri-
mary responsibility for setting fares, subject to virtually unrestricted
rights of disapproval by the aeronautical authorities of either govern-
ment.60 A detailed procedure was set up to deal with "open-rate"
57. Proposals for multilateral air service agreements continued to abound, and pro-
voked much discussion, until interest waned alter 1953. See W. O'Cox.oR, supra note 31,
at 49-85.
58. Bilateral air transport agreements to which the United States is a party are col-
lected at 3 Av. L. REP. 4j 26,305 (Aug. 18, 1971). About three-quarters of these, including
those with nearly every major country except the Soviet Union, are "Bermuda.t)pe" agree.
ments. See Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400, and S. 1540 (Rates and Practices In Foreign
Air Transportation-1964) before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1965). The Bermuda bilateral and the others which followed it
until 1948 were composed of the form language set forth for bilaterals by the Final Act
of the Chicago Conference, see p. 1113 supra, plus an "Annex" which contained the
provisions concerning routes and rate controls which had been the substantive subject-
matter of the bilateral negotiations. Thus it was the Annex to the Bermuda bilateral, cf.
note 60 infra, which became the model for subsequent bilateras. By 1948 the Bermuda
Annex had become so much the norm, insofar as it solved the problem of rate control
through delegation of rate-making competence to LTA, that the provisions of the
Annex concerning IATA were incorporated by the United States into a new "form" for
bilateral air service agreements which the United States has used since 1948. This new
"form," sometimes referred to as the "Bermuda form," replaced the provisional "Chicago
form" recommended by the Chicago Conference. Under the "'Bernuda form," thze Annex
or Schedule is reserved for provisions assigning routes or otherwise dealing with matters
negotiated de novo with each separate bilateral partner of the United States. Thus th
crucial paragraphs (e) and (f) which appear in § 1 of the Annex to the Bermuda bilateral,
see note 60 and p. 1116 infra, appear in Article 11 of the "Bermuda form" of bilateral
used since 1948. The "Chicago" and "Bermuda" forms are reprinted at 3 Av. L. Rra'.
26,306 and 26,307 (June 9, 1958). The specific bilateral usually cited as exemplifying
the "Bermuda form" is the Air Transport Agreement with the Fed. Rep. of German)',
July 7, 1955, [1956] 1 U.S.T. 537, T.A.S. 3536.
The fact that the Bermuda bilateral itself, supra note 55, is the "Chicago" form with
an Annex added hardly eases the confusion surrounding bilateral nomenclature. This
Note refers to both the "Chicago form" of bilateral with a Bermuda-type Annex. and the
so-called "Bermuda form" of bilateral which has been used since 1948 as "Bermuda-type"
bilateral air service agreements. There is one significant "Chicago form" bilateral still
effective which, because it was entered into before the Bermuda conference, is not of the
"Bermuda-type." This is the bilateral with Iceland, cf. note 105 infra.
59. See Address by George P. Baker, chairman of the United States delegation to the
Bermuda Conference, McGill University, April 18, 1947, reprinted in part in I A. CBAyEs,
T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRocEss 498.99 (1968).
60. The form of the Bermuda bilateral is as follows: the fourteen articles of the bi-
lateral are mainly procedural, and follow the form recommended for bilateral agreements
by the Chicago Conference. See p. 1113 and note 58 supra. The most important pro-
visions of the bilateral are contained in the Annex. Section I of the Annex provides that
the exchange of air traffic rights in the Annex is made "in full accord and compliance
with the principles recited and agreed in the Final Act of the [Bermuda] Conference."
See note 66 infra. Section III specifies the routes exchanged by the parties, subject to
amendment under § IV. Section V specifically invokes the capacity principles of the Final
Act. See note 66 infra. The critical question of rate regulation is dealt with in § 11.
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situations, which might result either from IATA carriers failing to
reach an agreement or governmental disapproval of an IATA tariff
agreement. The United States undertook "to use its best efforts" to
secure for the CAB powers under American municipal law to fix and
suspend rates for international aviation comparable to those exercised
by the Board over domestic aviation. 61 Until such time as the legisla-
tion was obtained, however, in the event that either government was
dissatisfied with a proposed new rate, the objecting government could
act under paragraph (f) to prevent that rate from going into effect.02
Under the alternative paragraph (e),63 which was to be effective once
the CAB had been given the power to set international rates, a gov-
ernment dissatisfied with a rate proposed by the other government dur-
The only arguable restriction on the plenary power of either party to disapprove al
IATA agreement is posed by the vague language of paragraph (h), see note 65 infra. Ac.
cording to paragraph (f), the sanctions there allowed until paragraph (f) is supplanted
by paragraph (e) are conditioned on nothing more than "one of the Contracting 'artles
[being] dissatisfied with any new rate proposed."
61. Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55, Annex, § II, paragraph (i).
62. Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55, Annex, § II, paragraph (0:
Prior to the time when such power may be conferred by law upon the aeronautical
authorities of the United States, if one of the Contracting Parties is dissatisfied with
any new rate proposed by the air carrier or carriers of either Contracting Party for
services from the territory of one Contracting Party to a point or points In the
territory of the other Contracting Party, it shall so notify the other prior to the
expiration of the first fifteen of the thirty day period referred to in paragraph (c)
above, and the Contracting Party shall endeavour to reach agreement on the appropri-
ate rate. In the event that such agreement is reached each Contracting Party will use
its best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put into effect by its air carrier or
carriers. It is recognised that if no such agreement can be reached prior to the
expiration of such thirty days, the Contracting Party raising the objection to the rate
may take such steps as it may congkier necessary to prevent the inauguration or con.
tinuation of the service in question at the rate complained of.
63. Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55, Annex, § II, paragraph (e):
In the event that power is conferred by law upon the aeronautical authorities of
the United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of persons and
property by air on international services and to suspend proposed rates in a manner
comparable to that in which the Civil Aeronautics Board at present is empowered
to act with respect to such rates fdr the transport of persons and property by air
within the United States, each of the Contracting Parties shall thereafter exercise Its
authority in such manner as to prevent any rate or rates proposed by one of Its
carriers for services from the territory of one Contracting Party to a point or points
in the territory of the other Contracting Party from becoming effective, if, In thejudgment of the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Party whose air carrier
or carriers is or are proposing such rate, that rate is unfair or uneconomic. If one of
the Contracting Parties on receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph (c)
above is dissatisfied with the new rate proposed by the air carrier or carriers of the
other Contracting Party, it shall so notify the other Contracting Party prior to the
expiration of the first fifteen of the thirty days referred to, and the Contracting Parties
shall endeavour to reach agreement on the appropriate rate. In the event that such
agreement is reached each Contracting Party will exercise its statutory powers to give
effect to such agreement. If agreement has not been reached at the end of the thirty
day period referred to in paragraph (c) above, the proposed rate may, unless the
aeronautical authorities of the country of the air carrier concerned see fit to suspend
its operation, go into effect provisionally pending the settlement of any dispute In
accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (g) below.
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ing an "open-rate" situation would be nonetheless obligated to allow
the proposed rate to go into effect, pending arbitration.0
The British motive in pressing for rate-fixing powers for the CAB
was apparently a feeling that the CAB could be trusted more than
Pan American to be "reasonable" in fixing "fair and economic" rates.a
Until the CAB received its expanded powers, the British reserved the
right of summary action against rate wars instituted by American
carriers. As a sign of good faith, Britain would rely on the CAB's
discretion once it had obtained full rate control powers. 0
The Bermuda Agreement contemplated that IATA normally would
reach agreement on fares, and furthermore, that these fares would
be approved by the governments whose carriers negotiated them. The
reservation by states party to Bermuda-type agreements of the power
to disapprove IATA tariff agreements was supposed to insure that
IATA would conscientiously consider all nations' interests in the
course of its fare deliberations. The provisions of paragraphs (e) and
(f), by preserving sovereign powers to regulate fares directly, were
expected to keep IATA "honest" but were not designed as practical
means for habitual rate-setting by governments disgruntled with IATA.
A central problem since Bermuda is that the CAB has not only been
64. Under Bermuda bilateral, Annex, § If, paragraph (g), either party can submit
a dispute over a proposed rate to the ICAO for arbitration, whether or not the rate has
provisionally gone into effect under paragraph (e) or (f). Although the ICAO's response
is termed an "advisory report," each government pledges to "use its best efforts under
the powers available to it to put into effect the opinion expressed in such report." Once
the CAB obtains the rate-fLxing power which will invoke paragraph (c), see pp. 1149-52
infra, the ICAO's report would have a mandatory effect on the CAB, at least so long as
§ 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act remains in effect: "In exercising and performing [its]
powers and duties under this Act, the Board ... shall do so consistently with any obli-
gation assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be
in force between the United States and any other [sic] foreign country or foreign coun-
tries .... " 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970).
65. The invocation of paragraph (e) is contingent on the CAB's receiving the -came
powers "to fix fair and economic rates" for international services that it now has for
domestic services. Paragraph (h) provides that "the rates to be agreed in accordance with
the above paragraphs shall be fixed at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all
relevant factors, such as cost of operation, reasonable profit and the rates charged by any
other air carriers." Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55, Annex, § II, paragraph (h).
66. As a second quid pro quo, Britain refrained from demanding explicit controls
of schedules and capacity, see p. 1115 supra. The Final Act of the Bermuda Conference
did speak, however, of a "fair and equal opportunity' for both countries' carriers to
operate flights between the two countries (Third and Fourth Freedom traffic) and an
"understanding" that capacity on flights proceeding on to third countries (Fifth Freedom
traffic) was to be limited to the legitimate requirements of long-haul, through service
and would not attempt to divert traffic from local or regional services. Final Act of the
Civil Aviation Conference, held at Bermuda, 15th Jan. to llth Feb., 1946, ( 4, 6. G0
Stat. 1512 (1946). The capacity principles of the Final Act were incorporated by reference
in Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55, Annex, §§ I and V. ef. note 60 supra. These capacity
principles were incorporated in Articles 8 and 10 of the "Bermuda Form" bilateral in
use since 1948, cf. note 58 supra. Their ambiguity has remained potentially troublesome.
See, e.g., McCarroll, The Bermuda Capacity Clauses in the Jet Age, 29 J. Art L. & Cost.
115 (1963).
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left without the international rate powers required to invoke para-
graph (e), but it has not even possessed, until very recently, the au-
thority to exercise on behalf of the United States the rights of summary
action allowed under paragraph (f).0
E. The Chandler Fare Crisis
The Board announced its approval of American carriers' participa-
tion in IATA immediately after the adjournment of the Bermuda
Conference,6 and after some initial reluctance, it began routinely to
67. See p. 1145 infra.
68. The IATA resolution of October 1945 establishing the Traffic Conference systei,
see p. 1114 supra, was filed with the CAB pursuant to § 412 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938) (superseded by 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970)), see p. 1135
infra. Although the decision was not announced until a week after the close of tile Ber-
muda Conference, IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 CAB 639 (1946), the three
members of the Board who attended the Bermtda negotiations had decided to approve
the IATA resolution prior to the Bermuda Conference, id. at 646 n. 12 (dissenting opin.
ion). In granting tentative approval to American carriers' participation in IATA for one
year, the Board emphasized its understanding that IATA's price-fixing would not extend
to the allocation of schedules or capacities-the same understanding which the American
delegation at Bermuda had reached with the British. Id. at 640-41 cf. note 59 supra.
The decisions filed by the Board reflect with considerable prescience the conflicting
values and abuses which IATA has displayed throughout the subsequent quarter century.
The three veterans of Bermuda, Chairman Pogue and Members Ryan and Branch, placed
heavy reliance in their majority opinion on the unanimity rule of the Traffic Conference
as a guarantee of each carrier's ultimate freedom of action. Rather wishfully, they
assumed that "an open rate situation may, and indeed should, exist if the rate proposals
advanced at any conference are unreasonable or economically unsound and are not
properly related to the reasonably attainable costs of the air carriers," id. at 615.
The majority members of the Board also contended that their legitimation of the anti.
competitive conference system was consistent with congressional intent. Section 412, they
argued, obviously contemplated agreements between competitors, and was drawn from
the similar provision in the Shipping Act of 1916 which had empowered the pertinent
federal regulatory agency to approve or disapprove such agreements. The Board could
therefore see "no indications of reversal of [the] national policy thus revealed il the
provisions of the Shipping Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act with respect to the rate con.
ference method." Id. at 642. The fatal flaw in the analogy to shipping conferences,
however, is that by customary accommodation, if not by right under international law,
merchant ships of all nations can generally gain access to foreign ports. See M. MCDOUGAL
& W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 99, 103-17 (1962). Thus "tramp" shippers
who refuse to conform to conference rates structures are not usually excluded from tile
international shipping trade by foreign governments interested in preserving certain
price levels. See generally Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HARv. L. REv.
635-38 (1964). Under the accepted doctrine of national sovereignty of territorial airspace,
airlines which persist in exercising their freedom of action by vetoing conference rates
or withdrawing from IATA may be denied entry into pro-IATA countries. See p. 1102
supra. Thus the IATA conference system could be expected to be much more cohesive and
comprehensive than the shipping conference system, where "tramp" steamers were an1
accepted fact of life.
In partial recognition of this fact, the majority noted that the present American car-
riers were flying into Great Britain and France at government-proclaimed rates. IATA
Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 CAB 639, 642 (1946). Given the limited powers of tile
Board, whatever influence the Board and American air carriers could exert through
IATA was the only alternative (short of suspending transatlantic air service) to accepting
unilateral rate control by foreign governments. Noting foreign fears of rate wars and
international subsidy battles, the Board declared that controlled competition was the
keystone of the public interest as defined by the Civil Aeronautics Act, id. 643.44, and
concluded that the IATA conference system could not, at least initially, be held to be
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approve IATA tariff packages. 9 Fares remained high and government
subsidies were essential for all carriers.70
Persistent demands by American carriers for lower fares led in 1952
to the inauguration of tourist class service across the North Atlantic,
at about seventy per cent of the first class fare.7 ' This sparked a sub-
stantial growth in passenger traffic7 2 and by 1955 the American air-
contrary to this concept of the public interest. In closing, the Board asked for the full
regulatory power over international aviation contemplated in the Bermuda agreement
as the only way "to meet with full effectiveness the problems that will arise in inter-
national air transportation." Id. at 646.
A vigorous dissent by the sole member of the Board not in attendance at Bermuda.
Member Lee (one seat on the Board was then vacant, see 6 CAB 1I (1946)), attacked the
Board's order as "an abandonment of the basic American economic principle of com-
petition." IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 CAB 639, 649 (1946). In his 'iew, the
conference system's unanimity rule would insure that fares were adjusted to the highest
rather than the lowest-cost carrier. Id. at 649-50. The threat of a suspension of traffic
rights would convince any over-aggressive competitor that lie would do better to pocket
his higher profit margins than to disrupt the whole system. In view of the Board's own
disclaimer of "effective influence" over rates, and the apparently secret nature of IATA's
proposed Traffic Conferences, adequate review of IATA agreements would be impossible.
IATA's promises of reduced rates in time had to be discounted by the fact that insulation
from price competition discourages aggressive management. LUTA would place a pre-
mium on wasteful non-price competition while reducing incentives to come up with
cost-cutting innovations. Id. at 655.
The dissent conceded that the fare controls of the British and French were perfectly
legitimate acts of air sovereignty. Id. at 657. IATA could not, however, be expected to
modify these expressions of national interests. Adequate powers to deter predatory prac-
tices by American carriers were vested in the Board through its control of subsidy pay-
ments and route awards. Id. at 660. The provision in the Bermuda bilateral for appeal
to the PICAO, see notes 43 and 64 supra, was sufficient protection against unilateral
British rate-making. 6 CAB 639, 661 (1946). This potentiality for inter-governmental
arbitration, claimed the dissent, made IATA unnecessary. The LATA conference s)stem
appeared to offer no advantages in persuading the Europeans to lower transatlantic
fares, and sanctioning IATA would only allow price-fixing on other routes to countries
which had not yet felt it necessary to assert their sovereignty over air fares. Id. at 658.
69. Following the approval of the Traffic Conference machinery, the Board refused
to approve the first tariffs produced by the IATA Traffic Conferences, on the grounds
that no showing was made of the proposed fares' relation to the economic cost of pro-
viding air transportation. The Board declared that, lacking such information, it could
not approve the fares. Resolutions of North Atlantic Traffic Conference, 6 CAB 845
(1946). The Board's problem arose from the fact that § 412 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938) (superseded by 49 U.S:C. § 1382 (1970)), required it to
approve the tariff agreement if "it does not find (the agreement] to be adverse to the
public interest," see p. 1135 infra, yet the Act's definition of the public interest in-
cluded "the promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges . . ." ch. 601 § 2(c), 52 Stat. 980 (1938) (superseded by 49 US.C. §
1302 (c) (1970)), cf. note 161 infra. The Board conditioned continued approval of the
Traffic Conference system on IATA's providing the Board with the minutes of these
Traffic Conferences. Resolutions of North Atlantic Traffic Conference, 6 CAB 845,
848-49 (1946). This show of procedural scruples proved to have little substance, however.
Despite IATA's continued failure to provide economic data or to show that such data
were considered in the fare-setting process, the Board periodically extended its approval
of the Traffic Conferences, IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 9 CAB 221 (1948),
and made its approval final in 1955, CAB Order No. E-9305, June 15, 1955. The failure
of the Board to enforce its initial requirement that IATA provide the Board with eco-
nomic data to justify its tariff agreements forms the Eighth Cause of Action in the
Aviation Consumer Action Project's complaint against the CAB, see note 4 supra.
70. See Keyes, The Making of International Air Fares and the Prospects for their
Control, 30 J. AIR L. & Co.t. 173 175-81 (1964).
71. See, e.g., id. at 176-77; S. W',HEA'rcRoFr, supra note 11, at 136-38.
72. Af. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLiN' INDUsTRY 119-20 (1959); K. PILL,
supra note 43, at 61.
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lines were operating their transatlantic routes at a profit, exclusive of
subsidies. 3
The CAB chose this setting to attempt for the first time to force
fares down through rejection of proposed IATA tariffs. The Board's
refusal to approve a first-class fare hike effective in the spring of 1956
brought cries of impending chaos from European governments and
resulted in the Board's retreat. 74 The CAB's call for more economical
service was answered by IATA after an interval lengthy enough to
prove that IATA acted of its own volition. High density economy class
fares, nearly thirteen per cent below existing tourist rates, were intro-
duced over the North Atlantic two years after the 1956 debacle. This
class proved so popular that tourist service was phased out33
From 1948 through 1962, passenger traffic across the North Atlantic
increased nearly 1000 per cent.70 First-class traffic actually decreased,
however, so that ninety-one per cent of the 1962 traffic moved in econ-
omy class.77 The CAB made clear, prior to IATA's autumn 1962 Traf-
fic Conference in Chandler, Arizona, that the obviously elastic econ-
omy class market should be cultivated by lower fares38 IATA re-
sponded by cutting in half the existing ten per cent discount on round
trip tickets, thus effectively raising the cost of air transportation for
most travelers.79
The CAB disapproved this fare increase, noting the acute over-
73. M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 72, at 176.
74. The fare agreements reached by IATA in the fall of 1955 called for a ten per cent
increase in first-class fares on North Atlantic and transpacific routes, without any reduc.
tion in tourist fares. The Board attacked what it felt to be the covert subsidization of
luxurious first-class service by artificially high tourist rates. While approving North
Atlantic tourist rates through December of 1956, with a strong argument for the-r reduc-
tion after that time, it disapproved the proposed first-class fares. Pan American World
Airways, et al., IATA Agreements, 23 CAB 275 (1956). Foreign governments expressed
shock at the Board's action, which came less than two months before the fares were to
go into effect. The Board responded by temporarily approving the first-class fares through
September 1956-the end of the summer peak travel season. See 1 A. CHAVES, ET. AL.,
supra note 59, at 514. The Board's chairman subsequently justified this change of heart
as a necessary sign of the Board's good faith. Hearings on Monopoly Problems, supra
note 4, at 326.
75. M. STASZHEIM, supra note 72, at 120; R. DAviEs, supra note 15, at 459.
76. M. STmrAszHim, supra note 72, at 272, table C-2.
77. Id. The first-class fare New York to London, which by British edict had been$375 in 1946, cf. note 52 supra, fell to $325 in 1948, then rose to $500 in 1962. The econ.
omy fare in 1962 was $270. Id. at 273, table C-3.
78. See, e.g., 1960 CAB ANN. REP. 19; 1962 CAn ANN. REP. 19. See also Hearings on
S. 1539 and S. 1540 (International Air Transportation Rates) before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 15, at 13 (1963).
79. See generally I A. CHAYES, Er AL., supra note 59, at 524-75. The full ninety-one
per cent of transatlantic traffic moving in economy class was not affected by the reduc.
tion in the round-trip discount, because many economy class seats were filled by passen.
gers travelling on special group or excursion tickets. Nevertheless, the C.A.B. found that
some forty-six per cent of total transatlantic traffic and fifty-nine per cent of total
transpacific traffic was adversely affected by the round-trip discount reduction. Order
E-19385, March 18, 1963, 38 CAB 1063, 1064.
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capacity problems on the Atlantic routes caused by the precipitate
conversion of major carriers to jet equipment and deciding that higher
fares would only compound this problem.80 American carriers were
still making a slight profit across the Atlantic, and having received
no information whatsoever as to the financial condition of foreign
airlines, the Board was unable to conclude that existing fares were
uneconomical."'
The European carriers had, in fact, suffered heavy losses in the
immediate aftermath of conversion to jets,8 2 and European govern-
ments protested the CAB's action vehemently.8 3 Great Britain claimed
the right under paragraph (f) of the Bermuda bilateral to prevent
American planes from entering Britain unless they charged the Chand-
ler fares.84 The CAB "advised" American carriers to continue to grant
the full, pre-Chandler round-trip discounts.8s The British thereupon
threatened to impound any American aircraft entering Britain with
passengers paying less than the Chandler fares.80 The other European
countries remained united in support of Great Britain, likewise invok-
ing the powers left them under paragraph (f) of their respective Ber-
muda-type bilateral air service agreements with the United States to
decree that the Chandler fares were the only lawful fares which could
be charged for flights entering their countries from the United States.87
The Board disregarded the British threats for two nervous days, during
which the American airlines continued to charge the old IATA rates,
80. Order E-19294, Feb. 12, 1963, 38 CAB 1068, 1070-71.
81. Id. at 1069 n.2; Order E-19385, Mar. 18, 1963, 38 CkB 1063, 1064 (reaffirming
the Board's decision, tentatively expressed in Order E-19294. supra note 80, to disapprose
the IATA tariffs argeed upon at the Chandler Traffic Conference).
82. R. DAvIEs, supra note 15, at 530; S. WHEATcRoF, AIR Ts.uNstoar Poucv 101-02,
114-16 (1964); R. THoaxroN, supra note 31, at 1964.
83. See 1 A. CHAYES, Er AL., supra note 59, at 536-40.
84. See p. 1116 supra; cf. note 210 infra.
85. Letter from Robert Murphy, vice-chairman of the CAB, to Willis Lipscomb,
vice-president of Pan American World Airways, Inc., in I A. CutsArs, ET At-, supra note
59, at 540.
86. Testimony of Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor to the Dep'L of State, Hearings on
S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 33-34. The British required American carriers to
charge the Chandler fares by amending the carriers' operating permits to make operating
authority conditional on the charging of the Chandler fares. Any flight entering Britain
with passengers paying sub-Chandler fares was thus illegal, at least under British domes-
tic law. Senator Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, thought it
significant that the British acted by the indirect means of amending American carriers'
operating permits. The Senator avowed that the British had positive rate-making statutes
which they might have used. Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra, at 5. Senator Magnu-
son's conclusion that British use of the indirect method of fixing rates through amend-
ment of operating permits legitimized retaliatory American action under § 402 of the
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970), cf. note 93 infra, failed to take account of
the relative powers of the American and British judiciary in reviewing administratihe
orders, and of the liberal rules of American courts relative to foreign citizens' standing
to sue. See testimony of Alan Boyd, then Chairman of the CAB, Hearings on S. 153Y
and S. 1540, supra, at 11; cf. letter of Chairman Boyd to Sen. Magnuson, id at 111-12.
87. Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 34.
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before acknowledging that it was powerless under the municipal law
of the United States to exercise paragraph (f) powers or to compel
American carriers to adhere to any given fare.,8 The carriers promptly
complied with the Chandler fare agreement, while the CAB set about
explaining its failure to Congress.
F. The Midsummer Flights Dream
The Chandler fare crisis coincided with the release of President
Kennedy's Statement of International Air Transport Policy.8 0 In ac-
cordance with that policy, and in response to the manifest impotence
of the CAB vis-h-vis IATA and other governments, White House-
drafted bills giving the Board international rate-making powers were
promptly introduced in both houses of Congress. 0 Unfortunately,
the hearings held on the bills in both the Senate 1 and the House "
tended to concentrate on the short-term problem of what could have
been done to avoid the American capitulation over the Chandler fares,
rather than on the more fundamental issue of how to represent more
adequately the American public interest in the IATA fare-setting
forum.
There was much debate over the Board's power to suspend foreign
air carriers' permits in retaliation for the threatened detention of
American aircraft.0 3 The CAB and the State Department expressed
88. Id. at 29-30.
89. Statement on United States International Air Transport Policy, White House
Press Release, April 24, 1963, reprinted at 30 J. AIR L. & Coal. 76 (196-1).
90. S. 1540, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 6400, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963): The
White House letter of transmittal appears in Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note
78, at 129.
The original Foreign Rate Study required of the CAA, the precursor of the CAB
(see note 5 supra), by the Civil Aeronautics Act (see note 27 supra) concluded that pend-
ing the acquisition of more "practical experience with rates in foreign air transportation"
there was no "immediate need for the Federal Government to further regulate the
rates, fares, and charges of air carriers engaged in foreign air transportation .... CIVIL
AERONAUTICs AUTHORITY, REPORT OF INVESTIrATION AUTHORIZED UNDER AUrIoRiTy OF CIVIL
AERONAUTICS Aar OF 1938, H.R. Doc. No. 478, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1939). Four years
later, the Board first requested international rate powers, 1942 CAB ANN. RE'. 14 (1913?.
The request was repeated in 1944 CAB ANN. REI'., and, with the exception of the C.A.B. 5
annual report for 1966, has been reiterated annually since the 1946 CAB ANN. REP. See
also Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400, and S. 1540, supra note 58, at 38.
91. Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78.
92. Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400 and S. 1540, supra note 58.
93. See, e.g., id. at 24, 68-69, 89-90; Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at
3-18, 44, 56. Some argued that § 402(f) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(1)(1970), gave the CAB an indirect but potent means of controlling foreign rates. That
section provides, in part, that "[ajny permit issued under the provisions of this section
may, after notice and hearing, be altered, modified, amended, suspended, canceled, or
revoked by the Board whenever it finds such action to be in the public interest." 49
U.S.C. § 1372(f) (1970). The American scheduled carriers have long maintained that the
Board has wide latitude in using § 402(f), and have used this argument to bltnt legislative
efforts to give the CAB explicit rate powers. See Statement of Stuart Tipton, President
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their firm belief that such ad hoc action would not have been lawful
under either the Board's delegation of power from the Congress or
under the inherent power of the President, though many Senators re-
jected these disclaimers of authority.0 4
Congressional efforts to register disapproval of the Administration's
conduct resulted in the demise of the international rate powers bills.
Senatorial pique took the form of deleting provisions for executive
review of CAB international rate orders; once this action was taken
White House support for the measure waned and, having passed the
Senate, the bill died in House committee.9"
Having failed once again to secure international rate-making power,
the CAB began developing in the mid-sixties a different means of
bringing pressure to bear on IATA. Non-scheduled "supplemental" car-
riers specializing in charter flights began to make major gains in the
total transatlantic market after the charter industry was reorganized
in 1961.96 Through lax enforcement of the affinity rules governing
charter flights, the Board encouraged the growth of the supplementals'
of the Air Transport Association, Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400, and S. 1540, supra
note 58, at 68. 89-90. Former Chairman Boyd of the CAB, however, read & 402(f) as
conferring the very narrow powers of quashing "destructive" behavior "inimical" to
American interests and felt that a dispute about what was a reasonable rate, such as was
involved in the Chandler fare crisis, was not within the compass of § -102(f)'s suspension
power. Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra, at 8. Chairman Boyd's position is the
more defensible, for the decision of the Congress in 1938 not to give the Board foreign
rate powers would seem to mandate a conservative reading of the Board's powers under
§ 402(f). See Note, Regulation of International Aviation, 75 HAnv. L. Rrv. 575, 584-85
(1962). In any event, the passage of Pub. L. No. 92-259, see pp. 1135-36 infra, has
rendered the dispute moot.
94. Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 18-19, 44.
95. As introduced, S. 1540 provided for presidential approval of any order by the
CAB setting international air fares. S. 1540, 88th Cong.. Ist Sess., 8 2(b) (1953) reprintd
in Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 133. After first reporting S. 1540
favorably, S. REP. No. 473, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee issued a revised report in which S. 1540 was amended to exclude executive re-
view, S. REP. No. 473, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Although this move was pre-
sented as an effort at sparing the President a needless technical task, id. at 1, the amend-
ment was apparently intended to serve primarily as an expression of Congressional dis-
favor with the Administration's "soft" line during the Ciandler fare crisis. Intcrvieu'
with a member of the Senate Commerce Committee staff, Oct. 19, 1971.
As amended, S. 1540 passed the Senate, 109 CoNG. REC. 22790 (No%'. 26, 1963). The
removal of provision for executive review from S. 1540, plus the confusion caused by
President Kennedy's assassination the day after S. 1540 as amended was reported out of
Committee, cut off further White House support for the measure. After S. 15-10 died in
committee in the House, fruitless efforts were made to revive the bill in the next
Congress. H.R. 465, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); S. 907, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See
Hearings on H.R. 465 (International Air Fares) before the Subconmm. on Transportation
and Aeronautics of the House Conlin. on Interstate and Foreign Coininerce, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 89-25 (1965).
96. Act of July 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143. See generally K. PiLt. :, supra
note 43, at 153-64; Hearings on Air Fares and Charter Service before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Conlin. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-80, at 193, 273 (1970). For the history of charter activity prior
to the 1962 Act, see Goldklang, Transatlantic Charter Policy-A Study in Airline ftegu.
lation, 28 J. Am L. & Cot. 99 (1962); Note, Supplemental Air Transportation-Public Law
87-528, 28 J. Am L. & Co.t. 453 (1962); and S. Ric.toxnD, supra note 20, at 85-95.
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market share.97 In 1966, the Board authorized the supplementals to
operate inclusive Tour Charters, which allowed travel agents to charter
an aircraft and sell tickets to the general public as part of a vacation
package of transportation, accommodations, and tourist services. 8
This boon to the supplemental industry was bitterly contested by the
scheduled carriers, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that the Board had exceeded its powers. 90 The Board was vin-
dicated by Congress, however, which in 1968 amended the Federal
Aviation Act to explicitly authorize supplemental carriers to operate
Inclusive Tour Charters.100 In addition to its support for American
97. The competition, both economic and political, between the scheduled carriers and
the supplemental carriers is extremely bitter. See, e.g., The Airlines Move Toward Mrass
Travel, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 26, 1972, at 49. The CAB, subject as it is to the whole range
of federal administrative procedure-law, already finds virtually every decision it makes
affecting the balance between the "skeds" and the "non-skeds" challenged in court by
the class of carrier adversely affected. See also Pilson, The Exemption Provision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act: The Problems Inherent in the Exercise of "pure" Adininistrative
Power, 29 J. AiR L. & CoNI. 255 (1963). Thus spokesmen for the CAB can admit publicly
to a pro-supplemental "tilt" only at the peril of eating their words in court. One such
public admission came from CAB Chairman Alan S. Boyd after the Chandler fare crisis,
when the CAB was anxious to establish its bona fides as a low-fare advocate:[O]f course, we are encouraging charters to the extent we can. We are trying to draw
a line, so we don't have the charters operate to an extent that they damage our regular
route carriers. WVe don't want that.
But we are trying to use the charters as a means of bringing down the fares, It is
one method that the Board had adopted and has pursued to accomplish lower fares.
Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 28.
There is thus little but inferential evidence that the Board has been consciously his
in its enforcement of charter flight affinity rules. All it will admit publicly is that It is
woefully understaffed to enforce adequately the convoluted affinity rules, which prescribe
the qualifications and procedures which a given group of travellers must satify in order
to charter an aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. Parts 207, 208, 212, and 214 (setting forth separate
sets of charter regulations for, respectively, U.S. scheduled air carriers, U.S. supplemental
air carriers, foreign scheduled air carriers, and foreign charter air carriers). Prior to
April 6, 1971, the charter regulations set forth at 14 C.F.R. Parts 207, 208, 212, 214, and 295
were not even consistent. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, May 8, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg.
7587 (proposing to repeal Part 295 and make the remaining parts substantially ldentical,
adopted, Jan. 29, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 2482 et seq.). The CAB's complaints that It is unable
rather than unwilling to enforce these charter rules, see, e.g., Hearings on Air Fares and
Charter Service, supra note 96, at 43, must be read in the light of the fact that the CAB
itself promulgated the unenforceable rules. As the furor over "black market" charters has
mounted, spurring the CAB to take selective action against a few violators, see, e.g., N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1971, at 66, col. 1; id., Sept. 18, 1971, at 57, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept, 20,
1971, at 11, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1971, at 62, col. 5, the CAB has proposed revising Its
charter regulations so as to remove the affinity requirement for groups who charter all
aircraft six months or more prior to departure. This proposal has been received very favor.
ably by the charter industry, and seems indicative of the Board's underlying sympgathles.
See Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Jan. 29, 1971, 36 Fed., Reg. 214 (1971);
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Dec. 30, 1971, 37 Fed. Reg. 222 (1972).
98. Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, Docket No. 13,795, Order No. E-23350, March
I, 1966. Regulations governing Inclusive Tour Charters were issued as 14 C.F.R. Part 378,
31 Fed. Reg. 4779 (1966). See I. PILLA!, supra note 43, at 164-65.
99. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. C.A.B., 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967), aHf'd by
an equally divided Court sub nom. World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 391 U.S. 461 (1968) (per curiam).
100. Act of Sept. 26, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867. The CAB's regulations issued
pursuant to the Act have imposed limitations on the types of ITC flights which the charter
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charter airlines, the Board has also been liberal in granting permits
to the increasing number of foreign charter carriers seeking operating
rights to the United States.' 0 '
Helped by fortuitous factors as well as the scheduled carriers'
own mistakes, the charter operators have in the past two years become
a serious problem for IATA.10 2 The first signs of cracks in the IATA
edifice came in the spring of 1971, when SABENA, the Belgian na-
tional airline, announced reduced youth fares for the peak summer
travel season. The Belgian government, which owns over half of SA-
BENA's stock, took advantage of the standard clause in IATA tariff
agreements permitting a carrier to break such an agreement upon the
orders of its flag government. 03
As was demonstrated by the Chandler fare crisis, successful European
resistance to American fare reductions is dependent on European
unanimity. 04 The relative proximity of the gateway cities of Europe
insures that, should one nation reduce fares on its flag carrier for the
carriers may offer. See 14 C.F.R. Part 378 (1971). The Senate recently held hearings on pro-
posed legislation which would remove most of these restrictions. See S. 3513, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972) and N.Y. Times, May 7, 1972, § 5, at 29, col. 1.
101. See Testimony of Secor D. Browne, Chairman of the C B Hearings on Air Fares
and Charter Service, supra note 96, at 8.
102. Three factors besides the CAB have helped tile charter operators gain strength.
First, the winding down of American military activity in Southeast Asia reduced the de-
mand for chartered troop-carrying airliners. Military traffic had been the staple of the
major American supplemental carriers during the middle sixties, serving to finance the
transition of the supplementals to jet equipment. Hearings on Air Fares and Charter
Service, supra note 96, at 193, 269, 273. As military traffic decreased, this equipment was
released to serve the transatlantic charter market. Friedlander, The New Low Air Fares
v. Bureaucracy, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1971, § 10, at 35, col. I. This extra capdcit)' drove
down transatlantic charter fares, attracting legions of charter passengers. Hearings on
Air Fares and Charter Service, supra, at 323-24; N.Y. Times, June 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
Second, scheduled airline managements repeated their errors of a decade earlier, pur-
chasing new 747 aircraft with the same unseemly haste that marked the introduction of
jet equipment in the late fifties. See S. WuH.rcaovr, supra note 82, at 94. These efficient
new jumbo jets made existing jet equipment redundant, causing a glut of old jets on
the used aircraft market. See, e.g., Altschul, Which Way for the Airlines?, B.umo 's, Mard
6, 1972, at 5, 19. These jets have been snapped up by charter operators at bargain prices;
while not as efficient as jumbo jets when both carry full loads, a fully-filled chartered
"old" jet offers per passenger costs far below a half-filled jumbo jet. Comparative cost
data for jumbo and standard jets appear in Hearings on S. 2423 (Regulation of Rates
and Practices of Air Carriers and Foreign Air Carriers) before the Subcoinin. On Aviation
of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-10, at 233-34 (1972). See also
IATA Cost Committee Report, Hearings on Air Fares and Charter Service, supra note 90,
at 61-119.
Third, the recession of the American economy has decreased traffic growth, especially
on the transatlantic routes, so severely that the new 747's have not been able to profit
from their increased efficiency because of under-utilization. The excess capacity causd
by more 747 seats and less American traffic have made the scheduled airlines that much
more vulnerable to diversions of traffic by the supplementals. See Hearings on S. 223,
supra, at 196-97.
103. For Belgium's majority control of SABENA, see, e.g., Hearings on S. 2123, supra
note 102, at 183. The exculpatory clause is discussed in N.Y. Times, June 1, 1971, at !,
col. 1.
104. Cf. pp. 1121-22 supra.
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flight from the United States to its capital, the other states will follow
suit or see a substantial diversion of traffic from their own airline and
airports. As long as rough equality prevailed in regard to the fortunes
or misfortunes of the European lines, European solidarity persisted.
The impact of the charter boom did not fall equally, however. London,
Paris, and Amsterdam got their share of charters, but few went to
Brussels. A few miles away, however, Luxembourg received thousands
of tourists as the European terminal of cut-rate Icelandic Airlines.105
The squeeze was apparently strong enough to convince the Belgian
government that severe measures were necessary to gain a bigger share
of the gateway city business for Belgium. On April 27, 1971, SABENA
gave the CAB thirty days' notice of a round-trip fare of $200 ($220
peak season) from New York to Brussels, for those aged twelve to
twenty-nine. Existing IATA fares ranged from $596 return economy
class to $357 for the lowest cost excursion ticket. By midsummer SA-
BENA's fare had been matched by all the scheduled transatlantic
carriers.106
This latest wrinkle was added to an already convoluted IATA fare
structure which attempts to underbid the charter airlines for the excur-
sion market while maintaining inflated fares for the captive market of
short-term travelers. 107 The discord over the summer youth fares pre-
cipitated a stormy six weeks' IATA Traffic Conference in Montreal.
The revised IATA fare agreement which emerged from Montreal was
then vetoed by the German national airline, Lufthansa, which de-
nounced the latest promotional fares as too low and too complex. 108
105. Icelandic Airlines, the only non-IATA scheduled airline crossing tile North At.
lantic, was founded in 1944 as a private venture. Iceland and the United States signed a
bilateral air services agreement in 1945, prior to the Bermtda Conference. Air Transport
Services Agreement with Iceland, Jan. 27, 1945, 59 Stat. 1464, E.A.S. 463. Icelandic Airlines
has thus been able to serve the United States without adhering to IATA prices, despite
years of harassment by European governments and the scheduled airline lobby within the
United States. Icelandic's sole European friend has been Luxembourg, which gathers a
share of the European tourist trade through service as Icelandic's gateway city. Icelandic
has usually keyed its prices to IATA's, offering about a ten per cent discount, which,
considering the location served within Europe and the older equipment which Icelandic
used to operate, served to keep Icelandic profitable but did not threaten the existence
of any IATA carriers. Icelandic's service disadvantages have been minimized in recent
years by Icelandic's acquisition, along with the charter carriers, of the surplus jets
sloughed off by the major scheduled carriers, cf. note 102, suera. The improvement in
Icelandic's service has led to new efforts to limit its operating rights to the United States,
Although the bilateral agreement with Iceland still stands, threats of its renegotiation
served to win Iceland's assent to a limitation on Icelandic Airlines' capacity to 2.5 per
per cent of total United States-Europe scheduled capacity. Modus vivendi affected by ex-
change of notes, June 24, 1970, [1970] 2 U.T.S. 1363, T.I.A.S. No. 6894. See generally
M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 72, at 53-55; R. DAVIES, supra note 15, at 459.
106. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1; id., June 20, 1971, § 4, at 3, col. 1; id,,
July 3, 1971, at 50, col. 1.
107. See S. REt,. No. 92-593, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 15 (1972).
108. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 1. See generally Hoffman, The Great Air
Fare War and What It Means to You, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1971, § 10, at 1, col. 1.
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Lufthansa then proposed even lower but less restrictive fares which
curried consumer favor while provoking charges of predatory pricing
from Lufthansa's American competitors. 109 After months of anticipa-
tion, tourists' hopes of a fare bonanza were frustrated by an intra-IATA
compromise which eliminated some restrictions on the promotional
fares while retaining the existing disparity between the cost of the
general and promotional fares.110
This retained disparity suggests that the entire fracas turned on
finding the best means of eliminating the CAB-fostered charter carriers
and returning the scheduled carriers to their earlier pricing hegemony.
As long as cheap charter flights remain the only effective means of
depressing IATA fares, IATA carriers may again decide to seek the
quick elimination of charter carriers through the temporary introduc-
tion of below-cost, "predatory" fares. Already the cracks papered over
by the 1971 IATA compromise have shown signs of reemerging, again
in the form of fares designed to lure away the charters' summer staple,
the youth market.'11
II. The Dysfunctional Interaction of IATA and the CAB
A. The Politics of IATA
The International Air Transport Association was initially given rate-
making competence in order to protect European airlines from the low
fares which only American airlines could economically offer. -12 The
expectation at Bermuda was that the CAB would obtain international
rate-making authority for itself, insuring that any deviation of IATA
from its intended function could be reviewed at a political level.' 13
The failure of Congress to grant such authority to the CAB has allowed
IATA to continue to set rates which bear little apparent relation to the
economic cost of providing air transport, long after the United States
has disavowed the short-term policy of economic protection which
secured American agreement to IATA in 1946.114 This situation is best
109. Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 14, 59, 213.
110. Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1971, at 9, col. 3.
111. See Wall St. J., March 6, 1972, at 2, col. 3; Friedlander, The Politics of Youth
Fares, N.Y. Times, April 23, 1972, § 10, at 39, col. I. Also, some IATA carriers are rumored
to be engaged in under-the-counter discounting of blocks of seats on scheduled flights.
Wholesale travel "consolidators" resell these seats individually to the general public. In-
terview with a staff member of the Senate Commerce Committee, May 12, 1972.
112. See pp. 1111, 1114 supra.
113. See p. 1117 supra.
114. See Statement on United States International Air Transport Policy, supra note 89;
Statement of International Air Transportation Policy, White House Press Release, June
22, 1970, reprinted at 36 J. AIR L. & Cot. 651 (1970). See also Hearings on H.R. 1716,
HR. 6400, and S. 1540, supra note 58, at 217.
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illustrated by a quarter-century's experience with IATA pricing policies
across the North Atlantic, the most lucrative international aviation
route in the world. Although the European air carriers have achieved
the size and operating efficiency necessary for effective competition
with American carriers, corresponding reductions in the overall cost of
air transportation have not been realized, 11 despite repeated calls for
lower fares by the United States government. 116
Although JATA likes to refer to itself as a private trade organization,
working out fare agreements through apolitical compromises among
business-minded airlines, 1 7 this characterization is only partly true.
With the major exception of the United States carriers, most major in-
ternational airlines are wholly or predominantly government-owned. 118
115. For figures on the relative efficiency of American and foreign international car-
riers, see M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 72, at 167-68; K. PILLAI, supra note 43, at 59. The
level of IATA fares across the Atlantic is discussed at note 128, inra. Transpacific fares
are discussed at note 122, infra.
116. See, e.g., 1966 CAB ANN. REP. 28; For CAB demands for transpacific rate reduc-
tions, see, e.g., 1969 CAB ANN. REP. 25.
117. See S. COHEN, IATA: THE FiRsr THREE DECADES 96 (1949):
"[M]uch of IATA's effort has had to be spent upon unglamorous and unreward.
ing matters. The spectacular achievements of air transport have been those of its
member airlines: none of IATA's accomplishments have ever created great public
excitement and, probably, little that IATA may do in the future will cause much
more....
IATA's great importance, therefore, lies in the fact that it has been the vehicle of
S. .joint effort. As such, it has served, rather than controlled. It has admitted nopolitics .
Mr. Cohen was writing as Public Relations Officer of IATA. After yet another decade
of IATA, Mr. Cohen, again in his official capacity, was ready to admit that 1ATA might
occasionally become entangled in politics-but only when external political forces inter-
fered in IATA's otherwise business-oriented negotiations. See Cohen, Crisis in the Con.ferences, 27 J. AIR L. & Coss. 150, 152-54 (1960):
To be quite precise, the airlines meet in the [Traffic] Conferences to work out
recommendations for fares and rates to be charged on international services. These
recommendations have no force in themselves: they must be carried back by airlines
to their own governments for individual review and approval before they can be-
come effective.
The airlines are not necessarily in the Conference because they want to be, but be-
cause their governments insist that international fares and rates be governmentally
agreed and realize that the airlines must have a voice in framing them ....
Fare negotiations . . . involve a wide variety of factors. There is not only the cost
of providing the service. One must also take into account the cost of selling it, the
traditional charges of competitive means of transport and the commercial risks of
promotional pricing. On these factors and many others like them managements stake
their own heads, their stockholders' money and their companies' existence. Most
governments have felt strongly that these are outside the proper competence of the
ordinary civil service and have therefore delegated the task of working out the pat-
terns of fares and rates to the airlines in the Conference. But they retain the right to
review and disapprove-which they exercise in the public interest. Make no mistake-
IATA Conferences may propose, but governments dispose.
... It has been said that the Conference system throttles competition: acttally, It
gives competition a chance to work itself out on paper, instead of through the costly
methods of the marketplace ....
See also Cohen, Confessions of a Former 1ATA Man, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 610 (1968).
118. See R. THORNTON, supra note 31, at 8 table 1; Statement of Knut Hammerskjold,
Director-General of IATA, Appendix B, in Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 181.
1128
Vol. 81: 1102, 1972
The Ins and Outs of IATA
The fact that government ownership is the norm in the international
airline industry has two principal effects on the expression of national
interests in international aviation. First, with government capital at
stake, the development of national commercial air power is viewed
by most states not in terms of the well-being of an entire system, but
rather in terms of the financial fortunes of a specific carrier. Second,
the representatives of this specific carrier at IATA Traffic Conferences
will in effect be government spokesmen.
The essential function of de facto government participation in
IATA Traffic Conferences has been the suppression of IATA's eco-
nomic behavior qua cartel in favor of political behavior in the manner
of a multilateral conference of governments. IATA is an imperfect
cartel 119 whose agreements are subject to the veto of any scheduled
carrier authorized to operate by an ICAO member country.120 This
circumstance should make agreement on tariffs contingent on the eco-
nomic viability of the rates proposed in the tariff agreement for every
carrier concerned. As a matter of rational, profit-maximizing economic
behavior, the insistence by an inefficient airline on high fares should
provoke an open-rate situation. Efficient carriers would propose low
fares designed to increase their share of the available traffic by driving
the inefficient carrier out of business, while simultaneously reaching
previously untapped portions of the air transportation demand curve.
The inefficient carrier's veto would prevent IATA agreement on these
low fares, but in the absence of IATA agreement the efficient carriers
would file their low fares individually.
Acting on its own, the government whose inefficient carrier was thus
attacked might choose to underwrite its inefficiencies through sub-
sidies, or at least to exercise its paragraph (f) powers by setting the fares
119. See W. JoRDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMiEIuc 5.6, 226-33 (1970). Fssential to
an economic understanding of IATA is the fact that the Traffic Conferences confer
monopoly powers over prices upon what is otherwise an oligopoly. While the price of
a service is fixed among its principal suppliers, total revenues are not allocated among
suppliers according to any agreement but are instead left co non.pricc market forces.
That is, while price competition is eliminated, other forms of competition remain to
affect the distribution of revenue among the carriers. IATA has sought to control some
forms of non.price competition, such as in-flight food and entertainment, but other forms
of competition, such as advertising, frequencies and schedules of flights, and the tpef aircraft used have remained beyond IATA'  control. See F. TIIAYER supra note 22,
at 288-93; K. PILLAI, supra note 43, at 66. The most effective forms of non.price compe-tition have proven to be frequent flights and advanced-design 
aircraft. The combination
of additional flights and larger, faster aircraft has created a persistent problem of over.
capacity. F. Tsixvs, supra, at 291-92; M. STRASZuE iM, supra note 72, at 105-07. This excess
capacity, by lowering the "load factor" or 
percentage of seats filled per flight, ies 
the
proportionate share of the costs of a flight 
which each passenger must pay. Tus ATA
may tend to maximize revenue without maximizing profit, because average costs 
are
increased by the imperfect nature of the 
cartel.
120. See p. 1114 supra..
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for flights directly to and from its own territory-its Third and Fourth
Freedom traffic-at a level high enough for its carrier to survive on
that traffic alone. In practice, however, states with nationally owned
international airlines have strengthened their positions through more
complex alignments of power within IATA. Those states with a com-
mon interest in thwarting IATA's economic behavior have implicitly
agreed to act in concert should an open-rate situation actually material-
ize. This concerted action allows a state to protect its high fare policy
during an open-rate situation not only by setting the price of its individ-
ual Third and Fourth Freedom traffic, but also by controlling the price
of its Fifth Freedom traffic-traffic which never actually crosses its own
borders. By pooling their sovereign prerogatives to fix the legal fares at
which commercial flights may enter and leave each of their countries
individually, contiguous states can effectively control the price of air
transportation to or through any one of their number. Absent such
agreement, their individually-set, artificially inflated Third and Fourth
Freedom fares would be subject to fatal collateral attack from a neigh-
boring country which might allow lower fares to be charged on its
Third and Fourth Freedom traffic.1 2 1
While the IATA bloc technique may be available to others,1 22 it is
121. Any country has a sovereign right to set fares on flights leaving or entering It-
Third and Fourth Freedom traffic. But such a right may not confer much effective
power over rates if passengers can fly much more cheaply into a contiguous state and
then cross into the high-fare country. Thus if state A wants to maintain a high fare oil
the route C to A, and has not agreed to do otherwise its bilateral air service agreement
with C, A can prescribe and enforce under its municipal law the fare to be paid for air
travel from C to A. Neighboring state B may also have air service from C, though per-
haps at a much lower rate. Unless A cares to. set the rate for transit from B to A equal
to the difference in the rates charged for travel C to A and B to A, or to institute a
taxing system which has the same effect, most traffic from C to A will flow C to B to A.
If, however, A can control the fare on route C to B-a route which if flown by A's air.
line is a Fifth Freedom route for A-A can enforce its C to A fare policy.
The easiest way for A to control the C to B fare is to make a deal with the govern-
ment of B. By co-ordinating their regulation of their respective routes C to A and C to
to B, A and B can achieve their mutual rate regulation goals. Of course, unless their alms
are identical, A and B will have to compromise to some extent. Were such conmpromiscs
elevated to the formality of agreements binding under international law, thereby plac.
ing restraints on the sovereign discretion of both A and B in setting rates on their direct
routes from C, this negotiation of a compromise fare would be a quintessentially diplo-
matic task. Yet such compromises, albeit in informal form and with independent rights
of action preserved through an exculpatory clause allowing a government to order its
carrier to bolt the IATA fare agreement, see p. 1125 supra, are the raison d'eire of
IATA Traffic Conferences. The unanimity displayed by IATA states in opposition to
American disapproval of IATA fares suggests that, at least vis-a-vis the United States,
IATA itself functions as a multilateral conference of governments.
122. Transpacific rates have, in the CAB's opinion, been too high for a decade or
more. See Hearings on HR. 465, supra note 95, at 27, 39; Hearings on S. 2423, supra
note 102, at 18. Because no contiguous states with air service to the United States border
on those countries principally served by the transpacific routes-Japan, Australia, Hong
Kong-high fare countries such as Japan have been able to enforce their fare policies
through control of the fares on flights directly to and from their countries, without
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the Europeans who have perfected this means of resisting American
low fare initiatives. The United States is particularly vulnerable to
such collective action because of its anomalous position as (1) the
source of by far the greatest number of IATA passengers, 123 (2) the
one major nation without de facto government representation within
IATA, and (3) a nation which has not provided under its own munici-
pal law any means of setting fares for its own Third and Fourth Free-
dom traffic. American affluence enables great numbers of United
States citizens to travel abroad. America's ancestry encourages great
numbers of Americans to vacation in Europe. This has made the North
Atlantic route the most lucrative in international aviation.124 The
United States has been liberal in granting access to this traffic: 123 nine-
teen IATA carriers serve the route.10 In spite of consequent problems
of over-capacity,12 7 fares on the route have generally remained at un-
economically high levels, 28 providing concealed subsidization of for-
having to secure Fifth Freedom protection through LkTA. Cf. note 175 infra. However.
as advocates of high fares in the face of American resistance, the major aeronautical
countries of the Pacific basin have always sided with the European countries in trams-
atlantic fare disputes.
123. R. THORNTON. supra note 31, at 59 table 5.
124. M. STRASZHEi, supra note 72, at 43, 177; R. D.viEs, supra note 15, at 472.
125. See F. THAYERR, supra note 22, at 78-79; see also R. DAVIES, supra note 15, at 457,
figure 75 and table 39.
126. K. PILIAi, supra note 43, at 58.
127. F. THAYER, supra note 22, at 292.
128. The rash of promotional fares in recent years has done little to lower the level
of basic fares-economy and first class fares without time or package.deai limitations. As
of 1964, only thirty-four per cent of North Atlantic traffic was tourist travel. The remain-
ing sixty-six per cent was a "captive market" of private and business travellers who lacked
the flexibility to conform to the stringent requirements of IATA promotional -fares. See
K. PIILAi, supra note 43, at 62-64. But see Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 208
(testimony of Najeeb Halaby, former President of Pan American, estimating eighty per
cent tourist traffic and twenty per cent "non-discretionary" traffic). These "captive"
travellers have had to pay the basic fares. Since LATA carriers are extrcmely secretive
about their operating costs, see id. at 53-60, cf. note 69, supra, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether IATA basic fares are economic in the sense of providing a "fair return"
over costs in terms of a percentage of invested capital. Of course, these costs alone would
not reveal the reasonableness of IATA fares, for the costs themselves are increased by
IATA-fostered inefficiency. Cf. notes 68 and 119 supra. The basic disagreement between
the CAB and foreign governments has been whether lower fares, by providing an incen-
tive for cost-cutting while attracting more passengers, would increase te net revenues
of most airlines. The CAB's "low fare philosophy," which American carriers claim the)
share, see Hearings on S. 1539 and S. 1540, supra note 78, at 5.1. but cf. note 207. infra,
is supported by a comparison of basic IATA fares with basic fares for domestic American
routes of similar distance, flown by similar aircraft. See R. THoRt-ro.v supra note 31. at
208-10 tables 11-13, and K. PILLAi, supra note 43, at 109-11. See also Statement of K.G.J.
Pillai, Executive Director, Aviation Consumers Action Project in Hearings on S. 2423,
supra note 102, at 225-32.
Present fares support the finding in R. TgoRNro.v supra at 211, that 1ATA fares are
generally higher than comparable domestic fares in the United States. The travel agent's
boast that it is now cheaper to fly from the East Coast of the United States to Europe
than it is to California is true only of the highly restrictive and seasonal excursion fares
which the transatlantic carriers have adopted to meet the charter carriers' competition.
As of May 1, 1972, the basic (one-way, coach class, without seasonal variations) fare for
the 2704 miles from Boston to San Francisco, the longest domestic trunk route, was
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eign carriers. Some carriers apparently feel that they could not profit
from the increased traffic which would be created by lower North At-
lantic fares.1-20 American carriers, the traditional leaders in excess capac-
ity on this route,130 have had the most incentive to generate traffic
growth through lower fares. Nevertheless, they have had only moderate
success. European carriers have generally remained united in opposi-
tion to lower fares, especially lower basic fares,' and as government-
controlled carriers, they have had the threat of a multilateral Fifth
Freedom price fix to back them up.
European unity is essential in this regard-due to the facility of
$157.41 (plus $12.59 federal tax), yielding to the carrier 5.82 cents per mile. The basic
fares (one-way, economy class) for the 3456 miles from New York to London on an IATA
carrier were $242.00 ($295.00 peak season), for a cost of 7.00 (8.54 peak season) cents per
mile, despite the fact that the longer length of the London flight allowed the fixed costs
incident to a flight of any length to be pro-rated across twenty-five per cent more miles
flown than on the San Francisco flight. An excursion traveler who happened to be going
to London for more than twenty-eight but less than forty-six days, and who otherwise
could conform his plans to the sixteen lines of fine print in the OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE,
might indeed fly to London and back for $240.00, at a cost of only 3.47 cents per mile,
unless he was traveling during the peak summer season, when he would have to pay
$313.00, or 4.53 cents per mile. The excursion fare from Boston to San Francisco and
return, requiring a stay of seven to thirty days and not permitting travel on Fridays or
Sundays from two in the afternoon to twelve midnight, was a year-round $236.11 (plus
$18.89 federal tax), or 4.37 cents per mile.
The differential found by Professor Thornton for transpacific fares remains extremely
high. For the 3460 miles from Anchorage to Tokyo, it cost, effective May 1, 1972,
$375.00 one-way economy, or 10.84 cents per mile. There were no seasonal variations for
either the basic fare or the excursion fare of $544.00 round trip, requiring a stay of
fourteen to twenty-one days, at a cost of 7.86 cents per mile. On the longer and more
heavily traveled San Francisco-Tokyo route, the one-way economy fare was $417.00, or 8.10
per mile for the 5149 mile trip. The round trip excursion fare of $709.00 cost 6.88 cents
per mile.
These fares and milages were compiled from OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, May 1, 1972
(North Amer. ed.) at 17 (excursion restrictions), 19 (mileage), and 565 (fares); OFFICIAL
AIRLINE GUIDE, May 1, 1972 (International ed), at 8 (excursion restrictions), 439, 819, and
825 (fares and mileage). Cf. R. THORNTON, supra at 210 table 13.
129. Among the inefficiencies which may deter some airlines from agreeing to Anerl.
can low fare initiatives are deficiencies of scale, see R. THORNTON, supra note 31, at
110,17, or the burden of providing service on strategic but uneconomic routes. See id. at
42, 121, 132; Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 6400, and S. 1540, supra note 58, at 217.
High fares also provide a net foreign exchange benefit to foreign countries by keeping
down the currency outflow which would follow from expanded travel to North America
by foreign nationals. Across the Atlantic, for instance, Americans have for the last
decade constituted between sixty and seventy per cent of the passengers, while American
airlines have carried less than fifty per cent of total transatlantic passengers. See Hearings
on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 13, and the figures given in Hearings on S. 1539 and S.
1540, supra note 78, at 99, and Hearings on S. 3197 and S. 3198 (Strengthen U.S..lnter.
national Air Transportation) before the Aviation Subcom. of the Senate Commerce
Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-60, at 15-16, 19 (1966). The high fares which make
transatlantic air travel unnecessarily costly to Americans also serve, because of generally
lower income levels, to deny such travel altogether to many Europeans. Although lower
fares might entail no loss of profit to airlines because of the additional traffic generated,
they would alter the proportion of non-Americans purchasing air transportation by inak.
ing international air travel available for the first time to the European middle class,
130. See the figures given in Order E-19294, Feb. 12, 1963, 38 CAB 1068, 1070.
131. See S. REP. No. 95-593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972). Basic fares are those for the
cheapest class of travel, usually designated as "economy class," unencumbered by restric.
tions on time of travel or length of stay. For most purposes the basic fare can be con.
sidered the cheapest one-way fare between two cities.
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intra-European transportation, any one major government allowing its
carrier to join with the North American carriers in providing low-rate
service during an open-rate situation would create a considerable diver-
sion of traffic from the other European carriers. 32 As long as no Euro-
pean country appears ready to give ground, however, the American
carriers have remained chary of provoking an open-rate situation by
vetoing IATA tariff agreements.' 33 The long-haul operations of the
American carriers in particular are economically dependent on Fifth
Freedom traffic picked up in Europe.134 Under the Bermuda agree-
ment this traffic is subject to vague restrictions.'"3 Should an American
carrier veto a rate agreement, retaliatory restrictions might be at-
tempted-a risk which deters American carriers from pressing without
restraint for lower general transatlantic fares so long as their over-
capacity represents merely unrealized profits rather than actual losses.130
B. Present Powers of the CAB
As currently constituted, the international legal process for the regu-
lation of air fares operates to the disadvantage of the United States.
This disadvantage has been caused in large part by the impotence of
the CAB in the international arena. Although the dichotomy between
the Board's domestic and international powers to protect the American
public interest was only tentatively established in 1938,137 it has re-
mained a dead hand on American international aviation policy ever
since.' 38
The prototypical Bermuda bilateral was predicated on the Board's
receipt of international powers commensurate with its existing ple-
nary authority over domestic air transportation. The implications of
this feature of our international airline rate-setting agreements can
132. See Thornton, Power to Spare: A Shift in the International Airline Equation, 86
J. AI L. & Com. 673, 676 (1970).
133. See K. PiLLAi, supra note 43, at 70-72.
134. M. SraAszHrm, supra note 72, at 208-09.
135. See note 66 supra. See also Hearings on H.R. 1716, H.R. 600, and S. 1540, supra
note 58, at 28-29.
136. This was the case in 1963. The revenue figures for American carriers published
by the CAB in its order making final its disapproval of the Chandler fares show a low
but not a losing rate of return for the transatlantic route. Order E-19385, 'March 18,
1963, 38 CAB 1063, 1064. This may account for the failure of the American carriers to
veto the Chandler fares at the Traffic Conference.
137. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed by Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301 ff. (1970)). See also pp. 1108-09 supra.
138. Cf. note 95 supra. Rep. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced H.R. 2911,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), which would have given the CAB international rate powers.
For a discussion of H.R. 2911, its companion bill S. 237, and earlier, equally unsuccessful
efforts at giving the CAB international powers. see Hearings on H.R. 4082, HJ. 2911,
and H.R. 3940 (Civil Aeronautics Act Amendments) before a Subconmn. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 21-84 (1949).
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best be appreciated by examining the powers of the CAB both before
and after the 1972 amendment1 39 to the Federal Aviation Act.140 As
in the Bermuda agreement itself, attention will be directed to the con-
trast between the Board's domestic and international powers. 141
Persons undertaking to provide transportation by aircraft as a com-
mon carrier are classified as "air carriers" and "foreign air carriers"
according to whether they are citizens of the United States or not.1 42
Air carriers may operate only by virtue of a "certificate" issued by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. 43 The Board must find the air carrier "fit,
willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, . . . and
that such transportation is required by the public convenience and
necessity"; otherwise it must deny the issuance of a certificate.' 44 For-
eign air carriers must operate under a "permit"' 4  which the Board
may issue if it finds the carrier "fit, willing, and able properly to per-
form ... [foreign] air transportation" and finds that "such transporta-
tion will be in the public interest."'146
While both air carriers and foreign air carriers are required to file
with the Board "tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air
transportation between points served by it,"'14  and must adhere to
these tariffs,' 48 only air carriers providing domestic air transportation
had a duty prior to the 1972 amendment, "to establish, observe, and
139. Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-259, 86 Stat. 95, 1972 U.S. CODE CON. &
AD. NEws 806. See also pp. 1135-36, 1146 infra.
140. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 ff. (1970).
141. For clarity, this Note contrasts the CAB's powers over "domestic" as opposed to
"foreign" or "international" air transportation. More precisely, the Act divides what Is
here termed "domestic" air transportation into two categories. "Interstate air traiospor.
tation" denotes transportation by aircraft as a common carrier between any two points
in the United States, except for air transportation within a single state not passing
through the airspace of any place outside thereof. "Overseas air transportation" refers to
air transportation between the United States and any Territory or possession thereof, or
between any two Territories or possessions. "Foreign air transportation" is any transpor-
tation wholly or partly by aircraft between the United States and any place ouside of
the United States. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), (b), (c) (1970). While the Board has full power
to set fares to be charged for "interstate" air transportation, the Board's power over
"overseas" air transportation is limited to the prescription of just and reasonable 3n-1
mum and maximum fares. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970). This curious provision, now ana.
chronistic, was part of the compromise in 1938 between those who wanted to give the
Board equal foreign and domestic powers, those (including the airlines) who wanted the
Board to have no foreign rate powers, and those who thought the Board's foreign powers
should be modeled after those of the Maritime Commission. See C. RivrN, S1upra note 20,
at 125-126. References in this Note to the Board's "domestic" powers are to its powers
over "interstate" air transportation.
142. Unless otherwise noted, the initial section number refers to the Federal Aviation
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958). §§ 101(3), (19), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801(3), (19)
(1970).
143. § 401(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970).
144.§ 401(d)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1) (1970).
145. § 402(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (1970).
146. § 402(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1970).
147. § 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
148. § 403(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1970).
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enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates, fares, and
charges .... "149 Air carriers providing foreign air transportation and
foreign air carriers were required only to refrain from subjecting "any
particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air trans-
portation to any unjust discrimination or any undue prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever."' 5 0
Before the 1972 amendment, the Board's control over international
tariffs was limited to ordering the removal of "unjustly discriminatory,
or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial" tariffs.' 5 ' The Board's
only influence over non-discriminatory international air fares was de-
rived from its duty to approve or disapprove any contracts or other
working agreements between an air carrier and any other air carrier,
foreign air carrier, or other common carrier, including agreements for
the establishment of fares. All such agreements must be filed with the
Board, 52 which must approve those which "it does not find to be ad-
verse to the public interest, or in violation of [the Federal Aviation]
Act." 5
3
As amended on March 7, 1972, the Federal Aviation Act now holds
all air carriers and foreign air carriers generally to the same duty "to
establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint
rates, fares, and charges ... ". ,1  The Board is empowered to suspend
for up to one year proposed or existing tariffs for foreign air transpor-
tation, and upon a finding that such fares are unjust or unreasonable
or discriminatory, the Board may cancel such tariffs and prevent their
use. 55 Should a foreign government seek to prevent an American air
carrier from charging the tariffs which the American carrier has filed
with the CAB, the Board is now empowered summarily to suspend the
tariffs of the foreign government's own airline, and to order the foreign
air carrier to charge the same fares as the American air carrier which
149. § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970).
150. § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
151. § 1002(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1970). This limited power to remove discrimination
allowed the Board to enforce § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970), which enjoins air carriers
and foreign air carriers from discrimination or prejudice in relation to "any particular
person, port, locality, or description of taffic .... " Although it was never put to judicial
challenge, the Board felt that § 404(b) did not permit it to regulate the general rate
levels of international airlines. See Hearings of H.R. 465, supra note 95, at 47.
152. § 412(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1970).
153. § 412(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970). The Board's approval immunizes the carriers
party to the approved agreement from liability under the antitrust laws. § 414, 49 U.S.C.§ 1384 (1970).
154. Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 3(a), Federal Aviation Act § 404(a)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a)
(2) as amended.
155. Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 3(a), Federal Aviation Act §§ 1002(j)(l)h.2), 49 U.S.C.§§ 1482(j)(1)g:(2) as amended.
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flies the same route.15 The operating authority of both foreign and
American air carriers is expressly conditioned upon these carriers'
obedience to the Board in the exercise of its new powers.157
The Board's power to set fares is still restricted to domestic air serv-
ices. After notice and hearing, the Board is empowered, upon a finding
that prevailing rates are unjust or unreasonable, to fix the lawful rates
to be charged for domestic air transportation.' 58 In determining lawful
rates, the Board is directed to consider, along with such other factors
as the promotion of aviation and the financial health of the carriers
concerned, "[t]he need in the public interest of adequate and efficient
transportation of persons and property by air carriers at the lowest cost
consistent with the furnishing of such service . . . ."15 The Board's
rate-making power is buttressed by the power to suspend for up to 180
days any new tariff proposed for domestic air transportation, while
hearings are held to determine the lawfulness of the proposed tariff.100
The denial of the CAB's repeated requests that this fare-setting
power be extended to cover foreign air transportation has severely
handicapped the Board in seeking to promote with equal vigor the
public interest in both domestic and international air services.101
156. Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 3(a), Federal Aviation Act § 1002(j)(3), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(j)
(3) as amended.
157. Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 3(a), Federal Aviation Act § 1002(j)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(j)
(4) as amended. Were the Chandler fare crisis to occur today, see pp. 1120.22 supra, tie
CAB could stalemate British moves to force American carriers to charge a given rate by
using § 10020) (3), supra note 156, to require that British aircraft charge the fares favored
by the American carriers and the CAB. When a foreign government orders its carriers to
lower its rates without forcing other airlines to comply (since the market will force them
to match the lower fare anyway), as happened with SABENA in the spring of 1971, scc
p. 1126 supra, the Board could act under § 1002(j)(l), supra note 155, to suspend the
new tariffs pending a hearing on its lawfulness under the duty to observe "just and rea.
sonable" fares newly imposed upon foreign air carriers by § 404(a)(2), supra note 154.
158. § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970).
159. § 1002(e)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e)(2) (1970).
160. § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970).
161. In delegating to the CAB the economic regulation of commercial aviation, Con.
gress set forth a broad mandate to the Board for the promotion of the public interest:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter, the
Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public inter-
est, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulataion of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and pre-
serve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster
sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations be.
tween, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
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While the Board has been able actively to promote the public interest
in the domestic arena, making judgments as to the public benefit of
given fare levels and ordering fares to be set accordingly, in protecting
the public interest in the international sphere the Board's role is essen-
tially passive.1 2 It can offer opinions as to the possible public detri-
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.
§ 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
In giving the Board the power to set domestic air fares, Congress directed the Board
to take into consideration, among other factors:
(1) The effect of such rates upon the movement of traffic;
(2) The need in the public interest of adequate and efficient transportation of per.
sons and property by air carriers at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of
such service;
(3) Such standards respecting the character and quality of service to be rendered
by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law;
(4) The inherent advantages of transportation by aircraft; and
(5) The need of each air carrier for revenue sufficient to enable such air carrier,
under honest, economical, and efficent air carrier service.
§ 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
In exercising the suspensive powers over rates in foreign air transportation granted it
by the 1972 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, the Board has been directed to con-
sider these same five factors, plus a sixth: "whether such rates will be predatory or tend
to monopolize competition among air carriers and foreign air carriers in foreign air trans-
portation." Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 3(a), Federal Aviation Act §§ 10V0j)(5)(A)-(l-), 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1482(j)(5)(A)-(F) as amended.
162. This active-passive dichotomy in the application of the Board's public interest
function begins with the initial application for authority to operate a given service on
a given route. Section 401 (49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970)) conditions the Board's issuance of a
certificate to an air carrier (including one seeking operating authority for international
service) on an affirmative finding that such service "is required by the public convenience
and necessity." (Emphasis added.) See p. 1134 supra. Section 402 (49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970)),
on the other hand, conditions the grant of a permit to a foreign air carrier on a finding
merely that the proposed service "will be in the public interest." See p. 1134 supra.
This contrasting use of the terms public "necessity" and public "interest," and "required
by" as opposed to "will be in," seems to impose on the Board a duty to scrutinize the
applications for certificates by air carriers more rigorously than the permit applications
of foreign air carriers.
The practical effect of this disparity is increased by the decision in Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945), which held that two applicants for a single radio
station license were each entitled to be heard before a decision was made. The .lhbacher
doctrine has been held applicable to CAB procedings for the issuance of an operating
certificate for a given route under § 401. Delta Airlines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir.
1952). By insuring a full and scrupulous consideration of the public interests affected by
the issuance of an operating certificate, the Ashbacker doctrine may well redound to the
public benefit when domestic air services are involved. When international services are
pending, however, an opposite result ensues. The laxer standards and diplomatic fait
accomplis inherent in the granting of § 402 permits to foreign air carriers vis..vis the
lengthy proceedings required for the issuance of a § 401 certificate allow foreign airlines
to "get the jump" on American carriers in servng new markets. Thus effective com-
petition, declared by Congress to be one of the primary components of the public inter.
est in air transportation, supra note 145, is adversely affected by the contrasting statu-
tory powers and administrative practices under the two sections. Cf. Hearings on S. 3197
and S. 3198, supra note 129, at 16-17.
Air carriers caught in Ashbacker's embrace in their competition for § 401 certificates
over a new foreign air route have been unable to turn Ashbacher to their advantage by
extending its scope to include foreign air carriers. Ashbacker has been held inapplicable
to a § 402 proceeding invovling a foreign air carrier who seeks operating authority for a
route similar to that at issue in a § 401 proceeding, even though both proceedings con-
cern petitions for operating authority over the same route. See Pan American-Grace Air-
ways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905, 909 (1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965); Pan American
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ment of existing fares; it can appeal to IATA for the adoption of its
international fare policies. But even with the recent addition of sus-
pensive powers over rates in foreign air transportation, the Board is
unable to take the initiative in changing international fare levels.
To paraphrase an IATA spokesman, the Board can still dispose of only
those fares which the airlines themselves have chosen to propose.10 3
III. Improving the Role of the United States in the Regulation of
International Air Fares
A. Retention of the Existing Regulatory Apparatus
In the light of the current, growing disenchantment of scholars and
businessmen alike with the efficacy of transportation regulation, 10 4 the
best remedy to the United States' disadvantageous position in the exist-
ing system for regulating international air fares might seem to be com-
plete withdrawal from that system pursuant to a unilateral policy of
"deregulation." No attempt is made here to evaluate the desirability
of regulation in terms of economic theory. It will be shown, however,
that due to the political constraints on the international air transpor-
tation market, a unilateral American policy of deregulation would
prove counterproductive to American interests.
World Airways v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 490 n.9 (1968). For comments by a member of tile
CAB, see Gillilland, The Role of the Civil Aeronautics Board in Licensing Foreign Air
Carriers, 32 J. AIR L. & Com. 236, 239 (1966). Nor is the dichotomy diminished by tile
Board's power under § 416 (49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1970)) to exempt air carriers from tile
lengthy § 401 certification proceedings, for § 416 has been narrowly construed by
the courts. See, e.g., cases cited, Hearings on S. 3197 and S. 3198, supra note 129, at 2-3.
Once service is initiated on international routes, the Board's promotion of the public
interest in economical air fares is still stifled by passive powers of regulation. The control
over tariff agreements vested in the Board by § 412 (49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970)), see p.
1135 supra, has proven to be of little real force or effect. First, the disapproval of an
agreement requires a finding that the agreement is actually adverse to the public hiter.
est. Thus, the Board cannot disapprove agreements which are of limited public benefit,
even when it feels a more beneficial agreement could and should have been adopted.
Second, the actual effect of disapproval under this section of the Act is minihal. As far
as the Board is concerned, air carriers and foreign air carriers are free to file whatever
rates they care to following disapproval of an 1ATA tariff agreement, and foreign gov-
ernments have been quick to set fares themselves if fares begin to fall during such an
"open-rate" period. See Hearings on Air Fares and Charter Service, supra note 96, at 53.
An antitrust action against air carriers which continue to fly at the same rates following
the Board's disapproval of a rate agreement under § 412 is theoretically possible, but
this sanction has never been employed. See Hearings on H.R. 465, supra note 95, at 30.
Finally, the suspensive power over foreign air fares given the Board by the 1972 amend-
ment is still a basically passive power, since the Board cannot prescribe new rates to
replace those it rejects as "unjust or unreasonable."
163. See Cohen, Crisis in the Conferences, supra note 117.
164. See, e.g., IV. JORDAN, supra note 119; Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? Cali.
fornia Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965);
A Case for Grounding the CAB, FORTUNE July 1971, at 66; Editorial, Room to Maneuver,
Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1971, at 12, col. 1; The Regulators Can't Go On This Way, Bus.
WEEK, February 28, 1970, at 60.
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As the examination of the evolution of a regulatory system for inter-
national civil aviation revealed, a multiplicity of factors enter into each
state's calculation of its public interest in international aviation.
Among the interrelated and occasionally countervailing elements
which constitute the public interest are economic, military, and diplo-
matic factors."l 5 History has shown that, because of these interests and
165. Included in the economic category are the desire of consumers for low fares, the
desire of investors for a "fair return," and the need of the national economy for a com-
prehensive route system and competent service. See K. Piu.Ai, supra note 43, at S. 32-33:
S. WHEATcROFr, supra note 82, at 46-48. The general value to the national economy of
international commercial aviation prevents characterization of these economic factors as
merely private (investor) interests versus the public (consumer) interest..As Congressman
Kuykendall of Tennessee put it: "No matter what public group comes in here and talks
about the public interest, it is not in the public interest to have regulated international
and interstate transportation go broke." Hearings on Air Fares and Charer Sen'ce, supra
note 96, at 403.
In a free enterprise economy, financial "health" for air carriers is presumed necessary
to the maintenance of air services. When the government owns a direct interest in its
flag carrier, as is true of most international airlines, the public stake in the balance
sheet of the carrier is even clearer. Whether ownership and control of an international
airline is private or public, the flag states involved have invariably preferred to subsidize
losing carriers rather than allow them to succumb to the vicissitudes of international
competition. See, e.g., S. WHEArcaoF-r, supra note 82, at 114-18, 183.85 (describing the
recapitalization of BOAC by the British government following BOAC's accumulated loss
of £ 80.1 million by the end of the fiscal year 1963).
In addition to the economic factors directly related to the profitability of an airline,
several subsidiary economic factors may figure in the public interest equation. Employ-
ment levels in the airline industry, and in the airframe manufacturing industry as well,
must be considered. See, e.g., F. THAYER, supra note 22, at 184-85. Emplo)ment will be
related to other considerations besides providing jobs for a state's citizens; as a source
of skills and technological capability, aeronautical industries may be maintained even
when they are uneconomic. See R. THoRN'ro.N, supra note 31, at 101-05. The British have
been the most notorious nation for sacrificing the economic well-being of their carriers,
and their ability to operate on lower fares, so as to support the national airframe manu-
facturing industry. See R. WORcEsrTF, RoOrs OF BRiT i AIR POLICY 16-78 (1966); COst..
OF INQUIRY INTO CIVIL AIR TRANSvoRT, BRmsi Am T ANsiOirT IN TrIE S'F.T is 195-99
(1969); M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 72, at 23. Britain's belligerence during the Chandler
fare crisis can be attributed to BOAC's chronic need for higher fares to offset the losses
it incurred in purchasing prematurely obsolete British equipment instead of American-
made long-haul jets. Cf. S. WHEATCROFr, supra. The problem seems likely to arise again
should BOAC and Air France be ordered by their respective governments to purchase die
Concorde SST irrespective of its commercial viability.
The military factor is a further aspect of the national interest in financially "health)"
carriers. Military planners see well-staffed and equipped civil airlines as a transport re-
serve. See generally F. THAYER, supra note 22, passim. Defense strategists will accordingly
support policies which maximize the number of civilian transport aircraft and their
availability to the military. In balancing the value of such policies against the cost, the
military may well discount costs which are paid out of commercial revenues or consumer
pockets instead of the national defense budget.
Both economic and military factors may merge into the diplomatic category. National
airlines are vehicles of prestige and propaganda, carrying oin the maritimie tradition of
"showing the flag." 0. LissrrzYN, supra note 1, at 56-57. International airlines may be
not only major foreign exchange earners in their own rilht, see W. O'Co.Nor, supra note
31, at 94; R. THoRN-roN, supra, at 92-101, but may also stimulate the development of trade
with countries they serve. M. STRtASZHEIM, supra, at 9-16. Moreover, international airlines
function as foreign policy poker chips. Concessions on routes or fares may be traded off
for advantages gained in other spheres of foreign affairs.
American acquiescence in high fares and the award to many foreign.flag carriers of
lucrative routes to and from American cities has been a covert form of financial aid to
co-operative allies, free from the recurring review to which congressionally appropriated
aid is subject. Such "foreign aid" has been used to secure American military bases on for-
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the correspondingly high value nations place on airline ownership and
operation, governments will not allow their airlines to live or die at
the mercy of market forces. 16
The Chicago Conference,"0 7 the Chandler fare crisis,10s and the
European subsidy battles of the 1920's and 1930's' 10 exemplify three
strategies available to protectionist countries for the frustration of an
American deregulation offensive. The first strategy, the sort displayed
at Chicago, is a boycott of air service with the United States by a group
of contiguous countries. The "Third World" of today can, like war-
torn Europe a quarter-century ago, successfully condition access to its
airspace on protection for its airlines. The artificially high fares neces-
sary on routes to underdeveloped countries for the economic survival
of these countries' airlines may be the "price" charged for inclusion of
these nations within a global route network. The United States should
rationally agree to pay this price, through the acceptance of rate regu-
lation, so long as the cost in the form of inflated fares does not exceed
the benefit of the resultant air service.
The United States interest in deregulation stems primarily from an
ability as a wealthy, technologically-advanced nation to support the
efficient airlines necessary for successful competition in a free air trans-
portation market. But also a function of wealth and industrialization
are the indirect benefits, aside from those values accruing directly from
airline operation and ownership, of participation in a comprehensive
network of global air service. These indirect benefits, realized in terms
of expedited trade and communications, flow disproportionately to
prosperous countries like the United States. Thus the loss of these in-
direct benefits would inflict greater damage on the United States than
it would on the underdeveloped countries which might boycott air
service should the United States seek to deregulate international rates.
The absolute cost of such a boycott would thus be greatest for the
United States. The relative cost might be higher for the boycotting
countries, however, because they have fewer resources with which to
eign soil. A classic instance of using air routes to keep a NATO ally smiling was tile award
of routes to New York and Houston to the Dutch national carrier KLM in 1957. Sec F.
THAYER, supra, at 78-79; R. THORNTON, supra at 99. See also Hearings on S. 1539 and S.
1540, supra note 78, at 24; Edles, IATA, The Bilaterals, and International Aviation Policy,
27 FE!). BAR J. 291, 298 (1967). Strategic considerations have not caused a "tilt" solely II the
favor of IATA countries. The value of American air bases in Iceland has been credited
with deterring the State Department from renegotiating the United States bilateral air serv-
ice agreement with Iceland, which permits Icelandic Airlines to serve the United States and
Europe at sub-IATA rates. M. STRASZHEIM, supra at 54-55; cf. note 105, supra.
166. See, e.g., pp. 1106, 1107, 1114 supra.
167. See pp. 1110-13 supra.
168. See pp. 1120-22 supra.
169. See p. 1106 supra.
1140
Vol. 81: 1102, 1972
The Ins and Outs of IATA
absorb the costs which a boycott would generate. Although this cir-
cumstance might make a battle by attrition against a boycott seem eco-
nomically rational for the United States, political factors must also be
taken into account. Politicization, within both the boycotting countries
and the world arena, could artificially prolong the boycott. The gov-
ernments of the boycotting countries might find it politically impos-
sible to capitulate and stay in power; given that the United States
would have provoked the boycott by withdrawing from IATA in pur-
suit of deregulation, rival great powers would probably appear with
offers to subsidize the cost of the boycott.170 Thus the United States
might find itself faced with rising barriers to re-entry into the boy-
cotting countries even if it capitulated to those countries' claims for the
regulation of air fares.' 7 '
A second caveat to the economic wisdom of the United States' seek-
ing to prevail against such a boycott is posed by the contradiction be-
tween the effects of such a policy and the supposed purpose of foreign
aid programs. Foreign aid seeks to foster economic growth in the de-
veloping world by compensating for and seeking the elimination of
some of the underdeveloped countries' disadvantages in the world trade
market. 72 The admission implicit in foreign aid is that this market's
allocation of resources, however efficient, is inequitable. It might well
lend the appearance of bad faith, if not inconsistency, to American for-
eign aid if the United States were to undertake a program of aiding
170. Such a subisidy could take two forms. Direct payments in cash: goods, and son'-
ices could seek to redress the harm inflicted on the boycotting countries' economies. Morc
likely, however, would be the provision of alternate air service, linking the boycotting
countries to a route network radiating from the friendly power. The underdes eloped
countries' participation in this alternate air service would be subsidized by the inter-
vening power, seeking to establish its own sphere of aeronautical influence. Cf. R.
THORNTON, supra note 31, at 152-53 (describing a Soviet attempt to achieve aeronautical
pre-eminence among new African nations).
171. Should the United States withdraw from IATA, thereby provoking a bo)cott of
the type hypothesized here, most American bilateral air service agreements would have
to be renegotiated. The Bermuda-type bilateral is predicated on LXTA's primary rate-
setting competence, see pp. 1115-16 supra, and it would hardly be honorable for the United
States to decide to begin disapproving all IATA tariff agreements without announcing this
change of policy in advance and giving the stipulated one year's notice for denunciation
of its Bermuda-type bilaterals. See, e.g., Air Services Agreement with the United King-
dom, Feb. 11, 1946, art. 13, 60 Stat. 1503, T.I.A.S. 1507 ("Chicago form," cf. note 58.
supra]; Air Transport Agreement with the Fed. Rep. of Germany, July 7, 1955, art. 16
[1956] 1 U.S.T. 540, T.I.A.S. 3536 ["Bermuda form," cf. note 58 supra].
It would thus be quite difficult to "call off" an unsuccessful deregulation initiative. By
contrast, when Britain threatened to end American landing rights during the Chandler
Fare Crisis, she was acting within her rights under the Bermuda bilateral agreement.
But see note 210 infra. When her grievance was satisfied, she could return to the status
quo ante. American efforts to achieve the United States' air fare goals outside of the
IATA framework would be based on economic power and sovereign prerogatives, not
negotiated rights, and there would thus be no guarantee that a restoration of air service
could be had solely at the United States' initiative.
172. See, e.g., C. KINDLEBERG.R, Ecoxomic DEvax.,tr,,%"r 361-79 (2d ed. 1955).
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economic development in a country while simultaneously attacking
one of its efforts at industrialization, its national airline17 a
Current attacks on IATA are often premised, however, on the mod-
ern equivalency of European and American industrial power. 174 While
the boycott strategy would be inappropriate, Europe could respond to
American withdrawal from IATA with the same strategy employed
during the Chandler fare crisis. Acting multilaterally, the European
governments could write into their municipal law the tariffs which
would have been incorporated in an IATA tariff agreement. 17 For the
United States to respond to this by itself setting fares for its Third
and Fourth Freedom traffic with Europe would be an admission of
defeat in its effort at deregulation. 70 When multiple sovereigns con-
173. Although creation of a national airline may not be an optional use of economic
resources, national airlines have a psychological value which cannot lightly be dismissed,
See W. O'CONNOR, su ra note 31, at 96. Arguments that the use of higher fares to sub-
sidize airline ownership and operation by modernizing nations is an inefficient allocation
of foreign aid resources may fail to take this non-quantifiable factor sufficiently into ac-
count. Cf. K. PILLAI, supra note 43, at 17-18. Second, the spillover benefits of airline
operation into other sectors of the economy are also difficult to calculate but are never
theless significant. See note 165, supra. Third, it may be unwise to end air fare "foreign
aid" without any assurances that the same amount of aid will be channelled into other
sectors of the economies of underdeveloped countries. A final consideration is whether
a paternalistic attitude toward underdeveloped countries which insist on entering the
international airline business is prudent, even if warranted by the fact that such invest-
ments may be an inefficient allocation of the countries' resources. Years of "dollar diplo-
macy" may have engendered suspicion of American economic advice.
174. Given the wealth of modern Europe, disruption of air service in retaliation for
American withdrawal from IATA is therefore unlikely to be instigated by the Euro-
peans, for it would inflict no disproportionate injury on the Unitec States vls.h-vls
Europe. Moreover, the relaxation of Cold War tensions and the gradual realignment of
super-power politics into a tripartite contest for Third World sympathies have reduced
the need for American economic concessions to Europe in return for NATO support. A
dispute over airline fares with a European government seems unlikely to push such a
state to the brink of revolution. Indeed, it has been suggested that, in view of the flow
of wealth accompanying the yearly horde of American tourists abroad, the United States
should consider employing the boycott strategy itself to induce compliance with Anerl-
can deregulatory demands. See K. PiLAl, supra note 43, at 142-143.
175. This strategy is also available to some non-European countries too wealthy to
have a bargaining advantage in a boycott. Japan, for instance, has long sought to main.
tain high fares on transpacific routes. Cf. note 123, supra. Because of Japan's island
geography, Japan needs no multilateral "Fifth Freedom" protection. Thus Japan has
been able to achieve its fare policies by simply setting fares tnder its own law whenever
the CAB disapproves a transpacific IATA rate agreement. Following CAB disapproval of
IATA's transpacific rates in 1963, an "open-rate" situation prevailed for four years,
during which American carriers continued to fly at the 1963 rates. See 1967 CAB ANN.
REe. 35; 1968 CAB ANN. REP. 50-51. An "open-rate" situation again arose in 1969, and
again no reductions in fares occurred. See 1969 CAB ANN. REP. 25.
176. In order to set rates on its Third and Fourth Freedom traffic, Congress would
have to grant the CAB the international rate powers advocated by this Note. Having finally
armed itself with international rate-powers, it would be extremely foolish for the United
States to then denounce its bilateral agreements, cf. note 171, supra, and withdraw from
IATA, at the very moment when provisions in our bilaterals conducive to lower fares
have at last become effective. See p. 1150 infra. In any case, the United States would
be at a disadvantage in a rate-setting contest with Europe, absent accord with Canada
and Mexico, because we would not have the collateral "Fifth Freedom" protection which
the Europeans have in the past secured through their unanimity in confrontations with
the United States. See pp. 1129-30 supra.
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trol access to the marketplace, one state's attempting to legislate a
"free" market is futile. The resulting mass of ad hoc legislation would
burden air transport in as costly a fashion as IATA's price-fixing, with-
out IATA's offsetting advantages of a low political profile and in-
tegrated tariffs.
A third strategy for sabotaging an American attempt at deregulation
would follow the pattern of the European subsidy battle between the
First and Second World Wars. Even when used merely to underwrite
inefficiencies and thereby to preserve a carrier's "competitive posi-
tion," subsidies distort the market. 7 7 The intra-European subsidy bat-
tles of the inter-war years offer historical evidence that subsidies can
be used as predatory as well as compensatory devices. In the current
context of privately-owned American carriers, it would be a relatively
simple and short-term matter for a single state to start a subsidy battle
through the introduction of below-cost fares, and then await the col-
lapse of the American carriers. The United States could and probably
would join the subsidy battle to support American carriers, but this
would lead to the inequity of all American taxpayers subsidizing a low-
fare bonanza for the minority of Americans who would actually travel
abroad. Because all states would have to join the battle or lose their
airlines, the cumulative cost of a subsidy battle may be greater than
the costs generated by regulation.
The availability of these strategies for frustrating a unilateral Amer-
ican policy of deregulation places regulation in its proper perspective
as a political necessity. Regulation of air fares functions as a means of
"buying" access to much of the international commercial aviation mar-
ket. As long as the present system of sovereign political jurisdictions
remains the central feature of international law, many air transport
markets will be open only to non-price competition.
Accepting the need for regulation presents the question of the form
which the regulatory process should assume. Some commentators have
proposed a system of direct intergovernmental negotiation of air
fares.' 78 This Note has sought to demonstrate that much of the bar-
177. When subsidized airlines keep flying instead of going bankrupt, they create
excess capacity. The passengers who fly on these carriers would, were the market
allowed to prevail, have to fly on the unsubsidized carriers efficient enough to survive
in a competitive market. This would raise the load factors of the unsubsidized airlines,
lowering their average costs and allowing them to offer lower rates. Consequently, even
where subsidies are paid merely to allow an airline to stay in the market and offer air
transport at the "market price," this price, as set by the most efficient carriers, is still
inflated due to the inefficiency imposed upon the whole system by the continued opera-
tion of the subsidized carriers.
178. Id. at 122-36; W. O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 131 ff. See also Statement of Dr.
K. Pillai, Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 230-31. Professor Thayer advocates re-
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gaining within IATA is in fact intergovernmental. Insofar as political
considerations dominate the economics of IATA, transferring IATA's
regulatory role to an officially diplomatic organization would promise
little improvement in IATA pricing policies. A far more likely result
of such a mechanism would be the aggressive assertion of sovereignty
into a delicate bargaining process. 170 This Note therefore advocates
exploiting the advantages of IATA, and minimizing its abuse of the
American public interest in lower air fares, through a more potent
means of representing American interests within IATA.
B. Alternative Means of Enhancing American Influence within IA TA
A campaign to enhance American influence within IATA must pro-
ceed along two fronts. First, some assurance must be gained that claims
for the protection of the American public interest will be articulated
within IATA, and second, provision must be made for the political
sanctions necessary to insure that such claims are effectuated in the
face of resistance from other IATA members.
The articulation of the American public interest could perhaps be
organization of American-flag international airlines into three regional, quasi-public inter-
national airlines, each being the sole United States flag airline in its area of operation.
See F. THAYER, supra note 22, at 304-06; Thayer, Air Transport Policy: A Crisis in
Theory and Practice, 36 J. AIR L. & CoNt. 661 (1970). Professor Thornton urges a
tougher bargaining posture for United States air route negotiations, but within tile
existing IATA rate-setting structure. Foreign support for American goals within 1ATA
would be one of the concessions sought through tighter controls on access to the lucra-
tive American air travel market. See R. THoRNWoN, supra note 31, at 241-42; Thornton,
Power to Spare: A Shift in the International Airline Equation, 36 J. AIR L. ?& Cost.
673 (1970). Dr. Straszheim likewise advocates better United States bargaining within
the IATA framework, but specifically rejects vesting the CAB with international rate.
setting powers. See M. STRAsznEIM, supra note 72, at 206-20.
179. While IATA fare-setting is rife with political factors, international air transpor
tation as a service and a livelihood for millions has remained remarkably free of entail.
glements with the day-to-day strife of modern "public" politics. Intrusions of political
hostilities into the airline industry, such as the hijackings of airliners by Arab guerillas,
provoke a nearly universal chorus of denunciation. Except during outright war, airlines
pass daily between states separated by bitter political disputes, providing a welcome re-
source of communication and a vivid illustration of the possibilities of peaceful coexist-
ence. Thus while sovereign claims to territorial airspace arc implicit within the whole air
transport system, under prevailing conditions these claims are not rattled along with
the other sabres in the sovereign closet. While airlines and air routes are the subject of
intensive, long-term bargaining, they are not commonly used as means for short-tern
sanctions or reprisals.
Air fares are, however, negotiated and renegotiated much more frequently than air
routes, and are much more interdependent. The publicity surrotnding these recurrent
negotiations would not be conducive to the understatement of sovereign claims to control
of the national air. Fare policies articulated in an inter-governmental conference, once
widely publicized, might be backed up with threats of exclusion from national airspace
of those who disagreed. Dependable air service over a global route network coult easily
be eroded by the ebb and flow of political influence and alliances. These dangers cal be
avoided by preserving the airline-to-airline facade of the existing rate regulatory process,
while nevertheless securing better representataion for American interests in the covert
political process which underlies the otherwise commercial atmosphere of fare negotla.
tions.
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most forcefully achieved through the nationalization of the United
States' flag airlines. American representation within IATA would thus
become a governmental function, with consequent political responsi-
bility. Adequate alternatives exist, however, which serve the goal of
protecting American interests from abuse by IATA without confusing
the issue of reforming IATA with the more complex problem of the
advisability of national ownership of major industries.
These alternatives involve legislation granting the CAB sufficient
regulatory authority over international aviation to allow the Board to
utilize effectively the provisions of the Bermuda-type bilateral air serv-
ice agreement.'80
The principal problem with the Bermuda-IATA system from an
American perspective has been Congress' failure for twenty-sLx years
to pass the legislation necessary for the United States to take advantage,
consistent with its own municipal law, of the Bermuda bilateral's reser-
vation of sovereign rights of action under international law. Thus
when the CAB has in fact disapproved an IATA agreement, it has
found itself unable "to prevent the inauguration or continuation of
the service in question at the rate complained of,"' 8 1 as allowed by
paragraph (f).182 Implementation of paragraph (f) by suspending the
operating rights of foreign air carriers required specific statutory dele-
gation of such "paragraph (f) powers" from the Congress to the CAB.
This delegation was not effected until March 22, 1972.11s3
Throughout the years when it was unable to take advantage of para-
graph (f), the CAB campaigned for the powers which would activate
paragraph (e) of the Bermuda bilateral. These powers "to fix fair and
economic rates for the transport of persons and property by air on
international services and to suspend proposed rates in a manner com-
parable to that in which the Civil Aeronautics Board at present is
empowered to act with respect to such rates for the transport of persons
and property by air within the United States,"'-84 would bring para-
graph (e) into effect in place of paragraph (f) for all signatories of Ber-
muda-type bilaterals. This would allow the CAB to prescribe the
proper rates for American international airlines while simultaneously
creating a binding obligation upon other governments to allow these
airlines to serve their countries at the CAB-set rates. But because the
180. See pp. 1115-17 supra.
181. Annex, § II, paragraph (f), Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55. See note 62 supra.
182. See p. 1118 and note 162 supra.
183. Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-259, 86 Stat. 95, 1972 US. CODE CO.c. &
AD. NEws 806.
184. Annex., § II, paragraph (e), Bermuda bilateral, supra note 55. See note 63 supra.
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CAB has not had the powers which would invoke paragraph (e), other
states have remained free to fix international air fares themselves and
to reject fares they disapprove of, with the sovereign abandon per-
mitted under paragraph (f).1 8 5 Unlike paragraph (e), which allows a
state to set rates only for its own airlines, the continued regime of para-
graph (f) has allowed foreign governments to prescribe the legal fares
American airlines must charge on international flights to and from the
United States. The CAB's prolonged lack of the "paragraph (f) powers"
necessary to retaliate in kind against such rate-setting by foreign gov-
ernments has rendered it impotent in past international fare disputes.
As concern over the possibility of a rate war on the North Atlantic
route mounted during the summer and fall of 1971, the CAB sent to
the Congress a draft bill presenting the Board's view of the powers it
required to protect the public interest in international aviation. Intro-
duced in the Senate as S. 2423,18s hearings on the bill were held on
October 19-21, 1971.187 During these hearings spokesmen for the Ad-
ministration supported the American scheduled airlines in their ad-
vocacy of an alternative draft bill. The substance of the Administra-
tion-industry proposal was substituted for the language of the CAB
version in the amended draft of S. 2423 which was reported out of com-
mittee in January' 8 and passed by the Senate on February 24, 1972.180
Immediately after the Senate hearings in October, a companion bill to
S. 2423 was introduced in the House.1 0 The House passed this bill on
March 1, 1972,191 and proceeded to amend and pass the Senate bill so
that it conformed exactly to the House version. 192 S. 2423 as amended by
the House was then passed by the Senate on March 7, 1972,11 and
signed into law as Pub. L. No. 92-259 by President Nixon on March
22, 1972.194
185. See Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 37-39.
186. S. 2423, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1971).
187. Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102. The author of this Note attended the hear.
ings and appeared as a witness on October 20, 1971. Portions of this Note were incorpo.
rated in the author's prepared statement to the Subcommittee, id. at 101-08.
188. S. REP. No. 92-593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Uan. 24, 1972).
189. 118 CONG. REC. S2457 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972).
190. H.R. 11416, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (Oct. 21, 1971). Having been amended in coun-
mittee so as to contain language virtually identical to that of S. 2423 as passed by the
Senate, the House bill was reported out of committee on the same day that S. 2423 passed
the Senate. H. RElP. No. 92-854, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 24, 1972).
191. 118 CONG. REc. H1636 (daily ed. March 1, 1972).
192. Id. The differences between H.R. 11416 as passed by the House and S. 2123 as
passed by the Senate were the presence in the House bill of § 3(b), amending the table of
contents of the Federal Aviation Act to conform to the amended powers of the CAB,
and the presence in the Senate bill of a § 5 providing that the bill would take effect
upon enactment.
193. 118 CONG REc. S3467 (daily ed. March 7, 1972).
194. 118 CONG REc. D314 (daily ed. March 24, 1972).
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The CAB draft of S. 2423 was a "paragraph (e)" bill.10 3 By giving the
CAB the same authority to set and suspend rates in foreign air trans-
portation that it currently has for domestic air transportation, it would
at last have made operative paragraph (e) of the Bermuda bilaterals.
Spokesmen for the White House and for the American carriers strongly
opposed the CAB draft precisely for this reason. By vesting the CAB
under municipal law with plenary rate-making powers over interna-
tional aviation and thereby invoking paragraph (e), the CAB draft
would have denied to the United States under international law the
right to prevent new fares from being put into effect by foreign car-
riers. Uppermost in the minds, and the testimony, of the opponents of
the CAB draft were Lufthansa's threats to bolt IATA and initiate a
North Atlantic rate war. Those opposing the CAB draft simply wanted
Congress to allocate authority for retaliation against what was widely
seen as a predatory price policy.1 90 The amended draft of S. 2423 which
was enacted into law followed this recommendation. The legislation
was confined to a grant of paragraph (f) powers. 07
195. CAB orders affecting international rates were to be reported to the President.
but were not made subject to his approval. In its provision for international rate powers
and its excision of Executive review, the CAB draft was similar to S. 1540 of the 88th
Congress, as passed by the Senate. See notes 90 and 95, supra. The CAB draft of S. 2423
contained a novel provision, however. Section 6 would have allowed the Board "in its
discretion and without a hearing" to suspend for up to one year the tariffs of a foreign
air carrier and to force such foreign air carrier to charge the same rates as charged by
American air carriers for the same route. Foreign air carrier adherence to such orders
of the Board would be a condition of continued operating authority for such foreign
air carriers to serve the United States. This provision for summary action by the Board
would not have impinged on paragraph (e), because the draft specifically stated in § 8
that nothing in the bill should be deemed inconsistent with § 1102 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970), which directs the Board to carry out its duties consistent
with any international obligations assumed by the United States. The new "fallback"
powers would have insured protection of the United States' public interest should another
country renounce or ignore its air service agreement with the United States. In such a
crisis, the Board could take immediate action against such country's air carriers without
having to wade through the administrative procedures and endure the ine vitable delays
in order to revoke a foreign air carrier permit under § 402 of the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970). Cf. note 93 supra.
196. See, e.g., Statement of Bertram Rein, Dep. Ass'L Se.., Dep't. of State. Hearings
on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 35, 40; Statement of Stuart Tipton, President of the Air
Transport Association. id. at 200.
197. The Air Transport Association (ATA), the trade association of the scheduled
American airlines, advanced a dusted-off copy of the bill which they had submitted to
the 88th Congress as a rival to the Whie House's S. 1540. See Statement of Stuart Tipton,
President of ATA, Oct. 21, 1971 (mimeo. copy distributed at the Hearings on S. 2423 on
file at the Yale Law Journal); cf. S. 1539, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). This ATA draft
provided for the suspension of any proposed or existing tariffs of foreign or American
air carriers which the Board found contrary to the public interest. A list of public
interest factors included in the proposal would have limited the Board's suspension
power to unjust or unreasonable tariffs, as determined according to the characteristics
of the service in question. The length of suspension was limited to one )car. and the
fares to be charged by carriers whose tariffs were suspended were to be the fares in
effect prior to the suspended fares.
The Administration did not present its own draft at the Senate hearings, although it
promised to do so later. Statement of Charles Baker, Ass't. Sec. Dep't. of Transportation,
1147
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 81: 1102, 1972
Public Law No. 92-259, in this emphasis on the recent phenomenon
of a threatened rate war, ignores the historical problem of IATA's re-
luctance to heed American requests for lower basic fares. Just two
days before Lufthansa's ephemeral fares were denounced by ashen-
Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 119. The Department of Transportation's bill was
introduced in the House on Nov. 16, 1971, as H.R. 11825, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See
H.R. REP. No. 92-854, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972). The Administration proposal
sought to achieve the same ends as the ATA proposal, albeit through somewhat more
elaborate language.
The amended draft of S. 2423 reported out of the Aviation Subcommittee to the full
Committee on Commerce followed the Administration and industry recommendations that
legislation be confined to paragraph (f) powers. S. 2423, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Comm.
Print (Nov. 17, 1971). The Subcommittee draft contained several refinemeuts of the ATA
draft, however. The ATA has maintained since 1963 that no further legislation wag
necessary to establish the authority of the Board to act tinder § 102 of the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970), to revoke the operating rights of foreign air car-
riers whose governments have acted prejudicially to American carriers. This broad read-
ing of § 402 is probably incorrect. See note 93 supr. Thus, Section 3 of the Subcomt-
mittee draft provided that Board orders affecting rates must be obeyed by air carriers
and foreign air carriers as a condition to their continued rights to operate in the United
States. The Subcommittee draft also avoided the problem of litigation over administrative
procedures (luring a crisis by retaining the "fallback" powers of summary action pro-
posed by the CAB (in addition to paragraph (e) powers) in its draft of S. 2123. Moreover,
the Subcommittee expanded somewhat the suspensive powers proposed by the ATA.
While the ATA would have limited the CAB to the power to suspend unjust or un-
reasonable fares for up to one year, the Subcommittee draft provided for a one year
suspension during which the Board might, after hearing, order the cancellation of the
suspended fare. The grounds for suspension under the Subcommittee bill are the tin.justness or unreasonableness of the fare. The Subcommittee language in this regard was
somewhat stricter than the ATA's. The ATA draft predicated suspension on the Board's
determination that the suspended fare was "inconsistent with the public interest." This
connotes the "passive public interest" test tinder existing § 412 of the Federal Aviation
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970), see pp. 1135, 1136-38 supra. By contrast, the Subcont.
mittee bill placed an affirmative duty on air carriers and foreign air carriers to establish
just and reasonable fares, and made suspension of a fare a preliminary to an inquiry as
to its lawfulness. The language and procedure of the Subcommittee draft thus made the
suspensory process regarding fares in foreign air transportation substantially the same its
that for fares in domestic air transportation, with the exception that the Board has no
power to prescribe the lawful fare in foreign air transportation. In short, the subcoi-
mittee draft seemed to allow the Board to scrutinize international fares much more
closely than would the ATA draft with its vaguer "public interest" mandate. Finally, the
CAB draft provided for no Executive review. Although ostensibly this dinission was be.
cause CAB fare orders are "technical" matters with which the President need not be
bothered, it in fact represented the pique of the Board and Congress with, first, presi.
dential "softness" during the Chandler fare crisis, and second, the political wrangling
during successive administrations concerning the award of new transpacific routes Se
Hearings on S. 2423, supra, at 27; cf. p. 1123 supra. The Administration objected strent.
ously to any bill which failed to provide for Executive approval of CAB rate actions.
Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 96, at 35, 110. The Subcommittee responded to the Presl-
dent's claims of constitutional power to review CAB rate orders with an innovative pro.
vision reflecting congressional distrust of past usage of executive review it aviationi mat.
ters. Section 2 of the subcommittee draft sought to forclose constitutional objection by
making CAB orders suspending or rejecting rates subject to the President's disaiproval.
A Presidential decision to disapprove a CAB order would have had to have been an.
nounced within ten days of the Board's submission of the order to ithe White House,
and to have been accompanied by a written statement "explaining in detail the reason
or reasons for disapproval." G. Hearings on S. 2423, at 99.
The full Senate Committee on Commerce, in reporting S. 2-123 to the floor, S. RE'. No.
92-593 (Jan. 24, 1972), made only one significant change in the Subcommittee draft. Execu.
tive review was limited to ten days' right of disapproval, but no written explanation of
such disapproval was required. The President was, however, required to find "that dis.
approval is required for reasons of the national defense or the foreign policy of the
United States ...." This language was retained in the version which became law.
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faced airline presidents appearing before the Senate Commerce Sub-
committee which held hearings on S. 2423,108 the chairman of the CAB
had emphasized to the subcommittee that the Board's long-term prob-
lem remains obtaining lower fares from IATA.100 The paragraph (f)
powers which are now law do not meet this problem for two reasons.
First, paragraph (f) was framed to protect the status quo. Its sanctions
are available only against new rates. As long as the sanctions authorized
by paragraph (f) are not exceeded, a fare dispute will lead to stalemate,
with fares maintained at existing levels. This is no accident. In 1946
the British feared Pan American World Airways much more than they
did the United States government, which might be trusted to have
some concern for a faithful ally.200 The raison d'elre for the alternative
paragraphs (e) and (f) was to allow the British to maintain their post-
war high fares until such time as the CAB, rather than Pan American,
would be setting the rates for American carriers. Thus, while para-
graph (f) powers for the CAB will afford some protection to the Amer-
ican public interest in aberrant situations where the CAB is seeking
merely to retain the existing fare structure against proposals for a fare
hike, paragraph (f) is useless to the United States in its usual efforts to
lower fares.
In contrast, paragraph (e) obligates the parties to Bermuda-type bi-
laterals to allow proposed fares to go into effect pending arbitration.20 1
Given the high comparability of air transport services, such that any
significant difference in price will create a substantial diversion of
traffic,2 02 paragraph (e) has a built-in bias toward lower fares. A party
proposing a new, higher fare poses no threat to a party which does not
see the need for a price increase; on the other hand, a party proposing
198. Hearings on S. 2423, supra note 102, at 212, 239-40.
199. Id. at 27.
200. See p. 1117 supra.
201. See note 63 supra.
202. As between airlines flying similar equipment between the same cities, the com-
parability of the service offered is total save or differences in scheduling. in-flight ameni-
ties, ethnic appeal, and the chances for a safe arrival. Times of departure are not subject
to any current controls, and so many flights tend to be scheduled at the same time. The
experience with the introduction of tourist class in 1952 and economy class in 1958 shows
that the air transport consumer's preference for lower price is strong enough to over-
come even significant differences in comfort and service during the flight. See p. 1120
supra; M. ST-.AszHurnf, supra note 72, at 119-20. Ethnic appeal has proven to be a strong
competitive force for choosing between equal-fare airlines, but it is doubtful that this
refinement of service competition could stem the diversion induced by price competition.
Relative safety records might influence the expert's choice of airlines, but the average
consumer has little access to the pertinent statistics, and the airlines themselves refuse
to capitalize on each other's tragedies because of the spillover effect of each individual
airline's mishaps on the reputation of the air transport industry as a whole. For a review
of the more limited diversion of traffic which price competition can achieve when routes
and equipment are not totally comparable, see note 105 supra.
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a lower fare will force the other party to match its price pending arbi-
tration.2 03
This low fare bias under paragraph (e) would create an incentive for
high fare airlines to cope with low fare initiatives within IATA rather
than risk a temporary open-rate situation. Under paragraph (f), how-
ever, a single airline might not hesitate to veto an IATA agreement
contemplating lower fares, for that airline's flag state knows that it
can, in the absence of a mutually acceptable IATA tariff, prevent the
inauguration of service at the lower rate, at least on routes serving the
objecting state. Moreover, this advantage to high fare advocates is mag-
nified when such countries act in geographically contiguous concert.20 4
Under paragraph (e), however, the leverage would be reversed. If
agreement within IATA were sabotaged or an IATA agreement were
governmentally disapproved, high fare states would have no further
lawful means to prevent lower fares from taking effect short of general
diplomatic pressure. Their wisest course of action would be to salvage
what concessions they could within IATA.205
Second, paragraph (f) powers not only inhibit the effectuation of
American low fare policies, but they leave even their articulation with-
in IATA to the whim of American carriers. American carriers satisfied
with a high fare status quo are immune from CAB sanctions because of
the purely suspensive nature of paragraph (f) powers. Since prescriptive
rate powers are denied to the CAB, there is no way of insuring that
American carriers will press for lower fares within IATA.200
203. The low-fare bias of paragraph (e) exists notwithstanding the provision for arbl-
tration. Much of the disagreement between the CAB and foreign governments may be
traced to differing expectations about the effect of reduced fares on carriers' net reven.
ues. See note 128 supra. Paragraph (e), by allowing lower rates to remain in effect pend-
ing arbitration, would permit empirical study of the effect of lower rates. This data
would either win support for the CAB's economic theories or force the Board to re-
examine the assumptions underlying its "low-fare philosophy." Moreover, the arbitra.
tion proceedings could well prove quite lengthy. The prospect of the CAB setting lower
fares for American carriers, and paragraph (e)'s guarantee of their effectiveness throutgh-
out a lengthy period of arbitration, maintains the potency of paragraph (e) in its prin-
cipal role of increasing the incentives for intra-IATA agreement on lower fares.
204. See p. 1120 supra.
205. The restraints of paragraph (e) are basically self-imposed, however, and there Is
always the danger that a petulant state may simply disavow its obligations under a bl.
lateral agreement. Or, a state might simply terminate its bilateral agreements on one
year's notice. See note 171 supra. Since some regulation of air fares is necessary, it Is
incumbent upon countries desiring generally lower fares to "bargain in good faith," and
not to seek to establish indirectly a "free enterprise" price of air travel by lowering air
fares until only the most efficient and well-capitalized carriers can afford to operate.
Paragraph (e) should thus be used to encourage negotiated reductions under the aegis of
IATA, rather than to force reductions down the throats of recalcitrant countries oil the
theory that the literal language of paragraph (e) will restrain such countries from tak.
ing reprisals.
206. A difficult question of construction would arise if the Congress were to grant
the CAB power to fix rates for foreign air transportation for American carriers only.
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In contrast, invoking paragraph (e) by authorizing the CAB to set
international rates would enable the Board to moderate the intra-
IATA behavior of American carriers. 20 7 As the United States seeks
a suitable stasis between coercion and concession, there is a constant
danger that the public interest may diverge from the interests of the
American international carriers. A certain amount of discretion is the
price of using the IATA forum, with its attendant benefits of nomi-
nally apolitical regulation and overtly voluntary compliance. But too
large a measure of discretion cannot be accepted. If the CAB were
armed with paragraph (e) powers, the Board's suggestions of desirable
fares, expressed in advance of IATA conferences, would carry much
more weight than they do at present. These guidelines, while ideally
not so rigid as to be binding on the Board when the resultant IATA
fare package is submitted for approval, would serve to inhibit Ameri-
can carriers from pursuing goals within IATA markedly at odds with
the Board's concept of the public interest. So long as the Board cannot
set the American carriers' fares for them, these carriers may continue
to acquiesce in unacceptable proposals at IATA conferences.208
Would this serve to invoke paragraph (e)? Short of a "compromise" consenting to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ or a referral to the ICAO for arbitration, there is no wa), of
getting an authoritative answer. This in itself would be the cause of much confusion;
a compounding problem would be the fact that no real effort to resolve the ambiguity
would probably be made until a crisis arose. An additional complication is the fact that,
since such legislation would affect virtually all air service bilateral agreements to which
the United States is a party, the ambiguity could not be resolved through negotiations
with just one bilateral partner.
207. Cf. Keyes, supra note 70, at 188-89.
208. The following dialogue is revealing in this respect. Congressman Samuel Devine
of Ohio: "In your statement of purpose )ou say you want to help the U.S. carriers to
bring down their rates. :. Do you think they have ever made an effort to brina down
the rates without assistance from your Board?" Chairman Alan Boyd of the CAB: "No. sir;,
I am generalizing here .... This could be an unfair statement. Certainly I want to make
it very dear that in my judgment Pan American, particularly, has been historically a low-
fare advocate on the Atlantic. However, as far as the Pacific is concerned, referrng spe-
cifically to Pan American and Northwest, who are our two carriers certificated to
operate across the Pacific, we are firmly of the opinion that we got a real song and
dance routine from those carriers in connection with what was involved in the Athens
Conference last year when we urged them strongly to try to bring about some reductions
in the economy-class services across the Pacific." Hearings on H.R. 465, supra note 89, at
26-27.
The need for some means of public control over the fare positions articulated within
LATA may become especially acute if American carriers should come to believe that they
must support high fares due to rising labor costs. 'Anxiety over high American labor costs
was recently voiced by the president of Trans World Airlines, see Hearings on S. 2123,
supra note 102, at 214, and a senior official of Pan American has stated that primarily
because of wage inflation, his company cannot afford to fly as cheaply as some foreign
carriers. Interview with John Champion, Senior Director-IATA, Pan American World
Airways, Inc., May 5, 1972.
Even if these fears are justified and the American airlines' historic position as low
cost carriers vis-A-vis foreign airlines is being reversed, cost-heavy American carriers should
not be allowed to represent solely their own interests at LATA traffic conferences. Per-
mitting American carriers to use the IATA mechanism to preserve their competitive
position through inflated fares is tantamount to establishing an industry-operated tariff
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Finally, even if the new law were more responsive to the long-term
problem of securing lower fares, it would still be inferior to imple-
menting paragraph (e) powers. The new law invites confrontation.
Under the terms of paragraph (f) resort to sanctions precedes multi-
lateral arbitration. By this retrogressive system of dispute settlement,
the swords of sovereign intransigence are allowed to cross. Yet, once
blood has been drawn, the likelihood that pleas of international law
and public order will be heeded is at its nadir. One has only to review
the debates, in press and parliament, which took place in Britain and
the United States during the Chandler fare crisis to gain a feeling for
how bitter relations can become between otherwise friendly nations
when air fares become an issue and paragraph (f) is implemented.200
As the mutual sanctions of the parties lead to stalemate, the danger of
escalation mounts. Considerations of domestic politics and interna-
tional prestige may make the issue of air fares recede into the back-
ground while jingoism takes hold. The fact that paragraph (f) con-
ferred upon the parties a right to take certain actions under interna.
tional law may be forgotten as the emotions evoked by paragraph (f)
sanctions lead to reprisals not authorized by international law.2 10
Paragraph (e), on the other band, holds out the promise of peaceful
and orderly international dispute settlement procedures. Both par-
graphs allow for arbitration under the auspices of ICAO of fare dis-
putes which cannot be settled within IATA or by diplomatic negotia-
tion between the parties.211 But the atmosphere of restraint created
commission. Economic protectionism should be a matter of public policy-not private
agreement. Furthermore, there is a danger that if they are left untramelled in the post.
tions they take within IATA, the American international carriers, with IATA's aid, will
make the public pay for management's mistakes. See generally Cordtz, Pan Am's Route
Across the Sea of Red Ink, FORTUNE, Jan. 1972, at 78.
209. See, e.g., 1 A. CHAYEs, ET AL., supra note 59, at 541-49.
210. For instance, Britain's determination in 1963 to use her paragraph (f) rights of
action led her to play somewhat loosely with the language of paragrapt (f). That pro.
vision applies only when "one of the Contracting Parties is dissatisfied with any new
rate proposed by the air carrier or carriers of either contracting Party .... " Bernuda
bilateral, supra note 49, Annex, § II, paragraph (1) (emphasis added). This language would
not seem to allow the British to impound American aircraft for flying at the old rates
specified in the expired IATA agreement which the Chandler agreement had been it
tended to replace. The issue was complicatd by the fact that the Chandler dispute re-
volved around the amount of the discount to be given for return tickets, not around the
base fare upon which the round-trip discount was calculated. Nevertheless, the American
carriers proposed nothing new, and asserted a right to keep flying at the old fare and the
old discount. It is likely that the British government was aware of the weak legal ground
for punitive action against American carriers, but felt that paragraplh (O's policy of nol-
tional self-help legitimated belligerent action despite the limitation imposed by a careful
reading of paragraph (f's text.
211. The arbitral procedure is set out in paragraph (g) of § II of the Annex to Becr.
muda bilateral, supra note 55. Although the ICAO's response is termed an "advisory re-
port," once the CAB obtained paragraph (e) powers, the report would have a mandatory
effect on the United States. See note 64 supra. By definition, a Board with paragraph (e)
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by paragraph (e)'s prohibition of sanctions pending arbitration would
probably be far more conducive to a mutual submission to arbitration
than the belligerent posturing produced by paragraph (f).212
In sum, legislation such as the CAB draft of S. 2423 would be much
more useful in promoting the American public interest and world pub-
lic order than the amended version of S. 2423 which has become law.
The CAB draft would have encouraged lower fares, insured responsi-
ble conduct by American carriers, and fostered the peaceful resolution
of disputes. Nevertheless, the 1972 amendment to the Federal Aviation
Act does serve to end thirty-four years of congressional inertia-the
legislative proposals conceived during past air fare crises have all with-
ered in one committee womb or another. The enactment of Pub. L.
No. 92-259 at least signals congressional willingness to deal with the
international air fare regulatory system, and as such bears a promise
of more useful legislation to follow.
powers would have the power to prescribe rates for United States' air carriers, see note
63 and pp. 1145-46 supra, and so would be bound to set the fare decided upon by the
ICAO's arbitral tribunal.
212. The ICAO has heretofore played a very minor role in solving disputes arising
under bilateral air service agreements. See T. BUERGENA ML, supra note 43. at 174-97. The
combination of (1) initial LATA rate-making responsibility, (2) paragraph (e)'s freedom
to inaugurate service at lower rates should IATA's rate.making prove unacceptable, and(3) appeal to the ICAO should any state abuse the low-rate freedom permitted by para-
graph (e), would seem to offer both the ultimate political accountability desired by com-
mentators who favor direct inter-governmentad rate-setting. see note 178 supra, and the
insulation from day-to-day political disruption which IATA currently affords, cf. note
179 supra.
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